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Abstract 
This paper analyses the structural principles used to apply the 
European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
[hereafter the ECHR or Convention] 1950. It reviews some of principles and 
tools of application utilised by the Strasbourg court when adjudicating to 
discern the rationale behind the instrument. The main issue that the thesis 
tackles relates to looking at the principle of subsidiarity and its evolution into 
the European Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
judicial system. The paper seeks to identify the manner in which the concept 
of subsidiarity is defined. It makes comparison of various definitions of the 
concept and evaluates the rationale as to why these materialise. It looks to 
illustrate and examine the application of subsidiarity in existing structures 
within the Convention system. Furthermore the paper looks to contrast 
existing definitions of subsidiarity within other legal systems to that of the 
European Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental structure.   
 Following on from this, there is commentary of the new 
reforms that seek to introduce the direct application of the principle of 
subsidiarity into the Convention system. The paper throughout will 
compare the historical application of this principle to that of the intended 
results of the new reforms. Therefore analysis of indirect versus direct 
subsidiarity will occur throughout. Furthermore analysis of the effects of 
the reforms is carried out to establish whether change is pending. Lastly the 
paper weighs the arguments for and against the direct application of the 
principle within the Convention system. Some contrast with existing as well 
as potential models of the application of subsidiarity will be discussed to 
paint an appropriate picture of the role that the principle may play in future 
human rights adjudication. An assessment of the role that the European Court 
of Human Rights plays and will continue to play in human rights protection 
application is also be examined.  
The focus of the research paper is to determine whether the 
extended emphasis on applying the Convention through the subsidiarity 
principle is one that will enhance human rights protections. In the thesis there 
are findings that the concept of subsidiarity is one that is interchangeable 
dependent upon the characteristics of the body or individual making use of this 
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particular terminology. The paper therefore contends that the principle of 
subsidiarity is one that is vague and flexible. This flexibility in turn allows 
subsidiarity to become quite the popular instrument for change and reform as it 
is adaptable to whoever holds its presence to hand. The paper finds that 
subsidiarity is a necessary instrument for the relationship of the Strasbourg 
Court as well as High Contracting Parties to exist on an acceptable and 
amicable level. The concept is also useful in making sense of the obscurities 
and critiques previously faced by the Court in its role as a supervisory 
mechanism. Furthermore the paper makes it clear that the concept although 
flexible does have an unshakeable foundation. This basis which derives from the 
idea of human dignity is what makes it possible for the principle of subsidiarity 
to be a positive instrument of change for human rights protection. Both 
human rights and the concept of subsidiarity derive their basis in the moral 
idea of enhancing the individual dignity and prosperity. The conclusions 
therefore within the research paper are that the greater application of the 
principle of subsidiarity within the European Convention system is one that is 
of benefit and will serve to enhance the protection of rights for individuals.
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1 Introduction 
The paper seeks to examine the structural framework behind the application 
of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(1950) [hereafter the Convention]
1
. It looks to evaluate how the principle of 
subsidiarity assists bodies with the Council of Europe to promote greater 
rights implementation and protection. The paper starts out by defining the 
research question. It then moves on to describe some of the theoretical 
foundations surrounding the concept of subsidiarity. Subsidiarity can be 
defined as requiring the central authority to have a subsidiary function, 
performing only those tasks which cannot be performed effectively at a 
more immediate or local level. The thesis explores some of the different 
definitions of the concept to determine underlying foundation in order to 
understand how the concept can be of use within the Convention system. 
The paper also looks at Convention’s historical development 
and produces examples of the application of the underlying sense of 
subsidiarity already inherent within the Convention system and discusses 
some of the issues surrounding this. The paper then moves on to give a brief 
introduction of the history of the Convention and its supervisory 
mechanism. It looks specifically at the drafting process to discern the issues 
that were of importance there and the purpose this serves; is that the author is 
then able to compare whether the debate then as well as that of now share 
any commonalities in terms of the issues that dominated then the legal 
conversation and may well to continue to do so as well today.  
Following on from this, the paper examines the evolution of the 
Convention and look closely into the status of the principle of subsidiarity with 
the Convention and responses as well as commentary on its applications. In 
this section, some case studies are included to illustrate some of the 
underlying issues faced by the Court and the High Contracting Parties. This 
serves the purpose of painting the picture of what the situation has been 
like and allows the author to draw conclusions of whether there are specific 
factors here that point towards the inevitability of a review of some kind or 
reform of the Convention, which in turn gave birth to the desire for the 
extended application of subsidiarity within the Convention system. 
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Moving on from analysing the existing illustrations of the principle of 
subsidiarity, the author explores the stages of review that serve to bring 
about the debate and focus of implementing greater application of the 
principle of subsidiarity within the Convention system. 
This chapter looks into the Conference which brought upon 
the new reforms. There is also reference to other associational meetings that 
contributed to bringing about further changes. Detailed examination of the 
type of subsidiarity promoted within the reforms occurs. Analysis is then 
made of the impact subsidiarity within the new reforms. The chapter also 
discusses the strengths as well as weakness embodied within the reforms 
in relation to the application of the principle of subsidiarity. Finally the author 
presents her conclusions by summarising the main themes within the thesis. 
The paper reaches certain conclusions through the reiteration of the findings 
within the thesis but also through the provision of the authors own predictions. 
The chapter will then sum up the issues in a wider context by also pointing 
out some of the areas in which the author fails to reach concrete answers. 
 
 
 
 
 
1 The text of the Convention is presented as amended by the provisions of Protocol No. 14 
(CETS no. 194) as from its entry into force on 1 June 2010. The text of the Convention had 
previously been amended according to the provisions of Protocol No. 3 (ETS no. 45), 
which entered into force on 21 September1970, of Protocol No. 5 (ETS no. 55), which 
entered into force on 20 December 1971, and of Protocol No. 8 (ETS no. 118), which 
entered into force on 1 January 1990, and comprised also the text of Protocol No. 2 (ETS 
no. 44) which, in accordance with Article 5 § 3 thereof, had been an integral part of the 
Convention since its entry into force on 21 September 1970. All provisions which had been 
amended or added by these Protocols were replaced by Protocol No. 11 (ETS no. 155), as 
from the date of its entry into force on 1 November 1998. As from that date, Protocol No. 9 
(ETS no. 140), which entered into force on 1 October 1994, was repealed and Protocol No. 
10 (ETS no. 146) lost its purpose. The current number of member state of signatures and 
ratifications to the Convention and its Protocols come up to the total of 47.
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1.2 Research Question 
The main research question is examining the concept of subsidiarity within 
the Convention system. The theme central to the thesis is whether there is a 
distinction between protection of rights before subsidiarity becomes deeper 
ingrained within the realms of the Convention itself. The paper seeks to 
explore whether the direct reference to the principle within the European 
Convention offers increased access to rights protection through national 
implementation. Some comparison occurs of what the process is now and what 
it means for the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms [hereafter the Convention]
2
 to possess direct application of the 
principle of subsidiarity. 
The research paper also seeks to establish where the need for 
the reforms derives and illustrate some of the factors that are contributory to 
inevitable change within the Convention system. The hypothesis within the 
research paper points to;; ‘law being an interpretative art and within 
interpretive theory choices are often made case-by case; issue by issue, as 
lawyers and judges decide of which theory is most appropriate to resolve a 
particular problem at hand.
3
 The Strasbourg Court in their application of the 
Convention adhere to this through the ‘effectiveness principle’4 by basing 
their decisiveness on the consideration of which tools or methods produce 
the most effective results and go from there. The hypothesis of the research 
paper points towards the potential of the subsidiarity principle as such a 
tool. The author aims to substantiate that direct application of the principle of 
subsidiarity allows for the achievement of the greatest human rights protection 
as well practical applicability of the Convention. Further more it works 
towards maintaining the application of the liberal democracy prefaced by 
all the members States within the Council of Europe. In other 
 
2 Ibid.1, 
3 Ian .C. Bartum – Constitutional Value Judgements and Interpretive Theory [2013] 
Scholarly Works Paper 700 pp.5 
4 Artico v Italy [1980] Para 33 
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words, subsidiarity as a guiding principle allows the resolving of human 
rights issues as they occur. The paper also reviews the implications of the 
structural application of the Convention using the subsidiarity principle. It 
will look to determine the approach taken by the Court towards the principle 
but also view the concept from the perspective of national authorities. There 
will be examination of whether the principle assists in determining some 
form of hierarchy in regards to which body hold authority in decision 
making matters relating to human rights adjudication. The author hopes to 
reach the conclusions that the principle of subsidiarity grants neither High 
Contacting Parties nor the European Court of Human Rights hierarchy in 
deciding matters relating to human rights adjudication. Rather, it seeks to 
offer balance, by awarding the responsibility of rights protection to both 
parties for the effective application of the Convention. 
1.3 Theory 
The paper seeks to place arguments within the research in line with 
Dworkin’s theory of law pertaining to theoretical foundations of justice. 
Before claims by legal theorist Ronald Dworkin, philosopher, Emmanuel 
Kant stated that; the pre-eminence of freedom ought to be the basis of 
political and juridical actions.5 Other philosophers such as Aristotle follow 
by claiming equality as the basis for justice and essential for establishing 
public policies.6 Dworkin’s theory of law however goes further than these 
two to include freedom and equality as complementary and essential factors 
that must be central to the formation of public policy.7 He lays this theory of 
justice as the foundation for political philosophy in understanding the 
normative construction of legal norms. The foundation to all public policy 
ought to factor on the right to equal respect.8 Dworkin argues that; all 
human beings by virtue of being human acquire this right. He follows in the 
line of natural law theorists who view human beings as moral beings and 
insist that law normativity must reflect this. 
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According to Dworkin, the issue of individual rights makes sense only if 
these are necessary for what the notion of equality demands. In other words, 
political consideration of a legal norm in respect to rights should ask 
itself ‘whether such a right or policy is necessary to protect equality’. The 
paper also make use of Dworkin’s theory of justice when seeking to analyse 
the impact that reforms will have on rights protection within the European 
Human Rights context. A scholar once stated that ‘denial of justice is 
always procedural’ and that there is need for an international basis for 
procedural justice in spite of the celebration of varied legal cultures and 
disparities.
9
 It is my quest to find our whether the subsidiarity principle as 
advocated within the new reforms allow for justice and to what extent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 Paul Guyer “Kant and the Experience of Freedom: Essays on Aesthetics and Morality”. 
Cambridge University Press, [1996] 
6 Roberts, William Rhys “Greek Rhetoric and Literary Criticism”, New York, Cooper 
Square, [1963] 1:13, 1373b
 
7
B.Horizente – Dworkin’s liberal egalitarianism [2006] Kriterion Vol 02 see also; A theory 
of Justice by Dworkin [1971] pp. 1 accessed via: 
http://socialsciences.scielo.org/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-  
5 12X2006000200003  
8 Dworkin, Ronald “The Original Position” [1975] pp3
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1. Theoretical Foundations of the Subsidiarity 
The principle of subsidiarity is said to provide an analytical description that 
assists in making sense of a variety of disparate features of the existing 
structure of international human rights law. Furthermore the concept assists 
in defining the interpretive discretion accorded to States; by defining the 
relationship of regional and international systems whilst offering the 
justification the necessity for international cooperation, assistance and if 
called for, intervention. A scholar referred to subsidiarity as one that can be 
marshaled to support virtually any vision from that of the European Union to 
supporting a future United States of Europe 
10 
As a structural principle, it 
integrates local, regional, national and international levels of social order based 
on a substantive vision of human dignity and freedom. The principle does so 
whilst protecting the pluralism amongst these levels.
11
 
The first instances of subsidiarity within an international 
sphere are reflected within the European Union [hereafter the EU], which 
has ingrained the concept intrinsically within its framework. Authors that 
draw their work on the application of subsidiarity with the EU affirm the 
concept of subsidiarity as deriving from the Roman Catholic social doctrine 
in the 1931 encyclical letter Quadragesimo Anno, which stated: ‘Just as it is 
wrong to withdraw from the individual and commit to a group what private 
enterprise and industry can accomplish, so too it is an injustice, a grave evil 
and a disturbance of right order, for a large association to arrogate to itself 
functions that can be performed efficiently by smaller and lower societies.’ 
This is a fundamental principle of social philosophy, unshaken and 
unchangeable. Of its very nature the true aim of all social activity should be 
to help members of the social body, but never to destroy or absorb them. 
9 Jan Paulsson “Denial of Justice in International Law”. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2005. Pp.306 
10 Peterson, John, (1994) "Subsidiarity: A Definition to Suit Any Vision?" Parliamentary 
Affairs, Vol. 47, No. 1, January. p. 116. 
11 Ibid. 162, pp. 40 
12 Van Kersbergen, Kees and Bertjan Verbeek, (1994) "The Politics of Subsidiarity in the 
European Union." Journal Of Common Market Studies, Vol. 32; No. 2, June. Quoted from 
McOustra on pp. 22 1-222. 
13 Peterson, John, (1994) "Subsidiarity: A Definition to Suit Any Vision?" Parliamentary 
Affairs, Vol. 47, No. 1, January. p. 11.
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12
This definition of subsidiarity contends that small social groups should be 
autonomous and sovereign in a pluralist society, yet united in a common 
morality which stresses duty and harmony. They should be assisted in their 
activities by a state which neither substitutes for social groups nor is shackled by 
their demands, but which serves the public good and provides legal 
order.
13
This theory of subsidiarity envisions that just as the individual realises 
her fulfillment in community with others, so do smaller communities realise 
their purpose in interactions with other groups. Therefore, it follows 
2. The shared concept of Dignity between Human Rights and 
Subsidiarity 
The section will look further into the foundation of the theory of subsidiarity 
but does so by contrasting it with that of the human rights discourse. The 
purpose for this analysis is to determine what the principle of subsidiarity is 
able to offer in matters of human rights protection. Some reference is made 
of some of the issues within the theory of human rights. The author will 
however limit herself to discussing the human rights discourse generally as 
opposed to entering into a debate in the actual theoretical presuppositions. 
The rationale behind this is to make ensure that focus remains on the issues 
at hand and does not sway into the philosophical ongoing debates 
surrounding the notion of human rights. The concept of dignity has been 
inherent in human rights discussions always but the definition of what 
dignity entail is one that is yet to be solved. The paper aims to refer to 
dignity as a concept and does not divulge into the theoretical foundations 
surrounding these. Rather focus of the discussion surrounds the impact of 
dignity on the human rights discourse as well its relevance to the principle 
of subsidiarity. 
 
14 Ken Endo, “The Principle of Subsidiarity: From Johannes Althusius to JacquesDelors,” 
Hokkaido  Law Rev iew ,  XLIV/6 (1994):  553 -652.  accessed via  
http://eprints.lib.hokudai.ac.jp/dspace/bitstream/2115/15558/1/44(6) p652-553.pdf 
15 Ibid. 10, pp. 116
 
16
Ibid. 10, pp. 118 see also; John Finnis - Natural Law and Natural Rights [1980] 
17 Ibid. 10, pp. 116 
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Individual dignity constitutes the cornerstone of the idea of human 
rights.
18
 It is not coincidental that the guiding instrument
19
 for human 
rights starts it provisions with the statement;; ‘all human beings are born free 
and equal in dignity and rights. The theory of human rights as a discourse 
contains the inherent struggle between affirming universal substantive 
vision of human dignity on one hand and respect for the diversity and 
freedom of cultures on the other. There is ongoing debate as to the foundation 
and basis upon which human rights as a discourse rests universality or cultural 
relativism. The human rights discourse is strongly oriented towards the 
individual. The rights and freedoms framed within human rights instruments 
appear in terms of the rights due to each person as an individual human being, 
not by virtue of his or her status.
20
 There are exceptions of course with the 
growing trend of collective and vulnerable groups’ rights. Some scholars 
view the principle of subsidiarity as a supporter for the human rights 
discourse because it is a conceptual tool that mediates both pluralism and 
uniformity for the common good in a globalised world.
21
 
The notion of dignity is supposedly inherent and present 
irrespective of state and independent of any action or recognition by the 
state. Endo argues that the theory of subsidiarity also places dignity as the 
root basis for valuing the individual human person in a way that precedes, 
morally from any form of human association.
22
 Nevertheless, the idea of 
human rights much like the principle of subsidiarity necessarily entails an 
affirmation of a degree of pluralism and diversity within society. Hence the 
underlying principle of equality in all human rights instruments. 
 
18 Klaus Dicke, The Founding Function of Human Dignity in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, in The Concept Of Human Dignity in Human Rights Discourse 111 (David 
Kretzmer & Eckart Klein eds., 2002); 
19 International Bill of Rights (Universal Declaration of Human Rights, hereafter the 
UDHR) [1948] 
20 Ibid. 17 
21 Paolo G Carozza – Subsidiarity as a Structural Principle of International Human Rights 
Law, American Journal of International Law [2003] 39 pp. 38 accessed via 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=984743  
22 Ken Endo, The Principle of Subsidiarity: From Johannes Althusius to Jacques Delors, 44 
Hokkaido Law. Review. 2020 -, 2026 (1994). 
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Endo views the idea of subsidiarity also as deriving its foundations from the 
conviction that each human individual is endowed with an inherent and 
inalienable worth or dignity. The value of an individual person is therefore 
morally prior to state or any other social groupings. Following this line of 
reasoning all forms of society form family to state and international legal 
order ought to be at the service of the human person.
23
 The end of such 
human associations must be the flourishing of the individual. There is a 
presupposition that the human person towards the flourishing is aimed is 
naturally social.
24
 An assumption in Endo’s theory is that the dignity of an 
individual requires relationships with others, in a variety of ways. 
Therefore, the value of the individual person as such as well as her 
fulfillment will be realised only in association with other people. This 
association in turn makes it possible for the individual to realise her or his 
inherent and primary value. The existence and end of the community is to 
help the individual flourish and to help her create the necessary conditions 
for her to reach her ultimate fulfilment.
25
 
The way in which subsidiarity is defined falls in line with the 
human rights based approaches i.e. those used within towards development 
projects. Amartya Sen’s capabilities approach is one such approach towards 
the right to development in that it focuses on the individual’s freedom to 
participate in important, valued aspects of life.
26
 This approach places 
‘humans’ as central to development and consequently followed into the 
human rights framework, whereby UN institutions utilises similar 
conceptions to advocate the importance of public policy centering around the 
well-being of an individual and saw emergency of concepts i.e. the AAQs 
as essential elements of rights realisation.
27 
 
23 Ibid 22 
24 Ibid. 23 
25 Ibid. 24 
26 Amartya Sen ‘ Development as Capability Expansion’ – Journal of Development 
Planning No.19 (1989) pp.41-58 
27 UN Committee on the ICESCR ‘ Implementation of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, GC No. 13 (1999) E/C.12/1999/10 accessed via: 
http://daccess-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G99/462/16/PDF/G9946216.pdf?OpenE
lement  
28 Ibid. 26, pp. 48-49 
29 Ibid. 19, UDHR [1948]
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Arguably the principle of subsidiarity is a legal norm that recognises and 
protects our capacity to pursue the good in question by a pluralism of paths. 
If we look at the freedom of religion, as a human right, this is independent 
from the ability to manifest one’s religion, whilst of course exercising 
this right would require association with others in kind. The recognition of 
subsidiarity as a legal norm suggests that the respect for diversity within the 
idea of human rights is really a function of the value of liberty.  
Liberty in this context therefore is definable as the freedom of 
individuals and communities to seek common good necessary for a 
dignified human life. Subsequently the discourse of human rights and the 
theory of subsidiarity can both be summarised as ideas that advance an 
understanding of the common good as based in the totality of conditions 
necessary for a full and flourishing human life. 
28 
An illustration of this 
would be the interdependence, interrelation and indivisibility of rights 
which through international co-operation and in accordance with the 
organization and resources of each State, of the economic, social and 
cultural rights are indispensable for his dignity and the free development of 
his personality.
29
 
1.4 Methodology 
The research focuses on four main aspects; a) Review of the historical 
evolution of the principles including that of subsidiarity governing the legal 
framework for the application of the Convention. It will explore the birth of 
the legal instrument, the Convention and the emergence of its supervisory 
mechanisms. Following on from that; b) it examines the existence of the 
principle of subsidiarity within the Convention pre reforms and illustrates 
some of the challenges and critique towards the structural framework of 
applying the Convention through illustrations of doctrines and case studies 
in the form of case law as well as analysis from juridical scholars on the 
matter. 
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The paper then; c) looks to identify the path towards reform through the 
analysis of the process that led to the current reforms underway. It looks into 
the way in which subsidiarity as a principle is introduced further into the 
Convention system. Finally, d) the paper analyses the current reforms and 
outcomes resulting from the Brighton Conference occurs to determine the 
extent to which subsidiarity as a principle is extended within the 
Convention. The make also discusses whether the purpose of a human rights 
document; in this case, the Convention can be met with subsidiarity as the 
structural principle of application. In this final section, analysis is made of the 
likely effects that the reforms might produce as well as some predictions and 
recommendations of the future development of the principle within the 
Convention system is explored.
  18 
2 Application of the Convention before the 
Reforms 
This chapter relates to the development of the Convention historically and 
lays the foundation for some of arguments that materialise further within other 
chapters in the research paper. The aim of the historical background material 
points the reader towards understanding the development as well as history 
behind the introduction of the Convention. Furthermore, it lays foundation 
for establishing the purpose as well as the institutional setting surrounding 
the instrument as this arises from the establishment of the source of law 
itself, the Convention. 
The end of the Second World War saw the birth of more 
international efforts towards cooperation and development due to the 
horrors witnessed that left most of Europe certain that an international effort 
to maintain and ensure peace was more than necessary. For the purposes of 
this paper, the establishment of the Council of Europe emerged from the 
then titled as the International Committee of Movements for European 
Unity emerged during a meeting in form of a Congress of Europe in 1948.30 
The meeting was pre eluded by a statement made in 1946 by then Prime 
Minister of the United Kingdom, Winston Churchill; who envisioned the 
building of United States of Europe which concerned itself with the 
development of a ‘Declaration of European Citizen Rights’.31 This saw the 
start of a journey towards international cooperation between European 
States and the need for an international instrument governing such 
collaboration 
30 The Liaison Committee of the Movements for European Unity was set up in Paris on 20 
July 1947. It comprised the Independent League for European Cooperation (ILEC), led by 
Paul van Zeeland, the former Belgian Prime Minister, the Union of European Federalists 
(UEF), led by Henri Brugmans of the Netherlands, and Winston Churchill’s United Europe 
Movement (UEM). the decision, taken in Paris on 10 and 11 November 1947, to replace the 
Liaison Committee with an International Committee of the Movements for European Unity 
(ICMEU) It was later joined by the French Council for a United Europe, the ILEC, the 
Nouvelles ƒquipes Internationales (New International Teams — NEI), the UEF and the 
UEM.See also: Gomien, Harris and Zwaak – Law and Practice of the European Convention 
on Human Rights and the European Social Charter [1996] pp.1 1 
31 Weil – The European Convention on Human Rights Background, Development and 
Prospects [1963] pp.22 accessed via http://www.jstor.org/stable/756117  
32Volume One, Preparatory Commission of the Council of Europe, Committe of Ministers, 
Consultative Assembly (11 May – 8 September 1949) The Hague: Martnius Nijhoff [1975] 
pp. 24
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It should be pointed out that subsequent preparation for such an instrument 
indicate that whilst the aftermath of World War II encouraged the need for 
greater cooperation by European States in global matters such as the 
economy, when the issue of adding human rights to the agenda arose, the 
journey met with some reluctance. Winston Churchill prompted the issue 
of adding human rights to the agenda of the Council of Europe by remarks 
that;; ‘A European Assembly forbidden to discuss human rights would...be a 
ludicrous proposition to the world’.32 
Despite the reluctance, ten High Contracting Parties in Rome 
nevertheless signed the ECHR in November 1950. The issue of human rights 
as part of the agenda of the Council of Europe appeared further when the 
question of whether a supervisory mechanism as a collective guarantee for the 
effective application of the Convention should be established.
33
 There was 
division amongst those who saw the emergence of a collective guarantee in 
form of an international Commission and Court as threatening to 
national sovereignty and those who embraced it as necessary for the 
protection of rights.
34
 Certain members within the Committee of Ministers 
were vocal in their objections. Lord Chancellor Jowett remarked that;; ‘we 
should not encourage our European friends to jeopardise our whole system 
of law, which we have built over the centuries in favour of some half-baked 
scheme to be administered by some unknown court.
35
 This struggle 
between interests of national sovereignty on one hand and human rights 
protection on the other continued
36
 well after the ratification of the Convention 
and still dominates legal debate even today. 
The drafting process of the Convention points to some of the 
struggles prominent and illustrates that the structural framework of the 
Convention played a material role in the debate then as it does now. The 
ECHR came into force in 1953 upon ratification by all the ten Signatory 
Parties. The Convention includes civil and political rights and forms a pan-
European regime of human rights protection to which all member States to 
the Council of Europe [hereafter COE] are parties.
37 
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3. The role of the Court as a supervisory mechanism 
This sub section discusses the development of the Convention once it had 
come into force and looks to illustrate further the role played by the 
Convention and its supervisory bodies in developing the Council of Europe. 
The objective of the COE is to develop and protect common democratic 
principles throughout Europe i.e. the rule of law and human rights. For the 
Convention to successful operate, there needed to be to a supervisory 
mechanism. This came in the form of the European Court of Human Rights, 
[hereafter the Court] together with the Commission in 1958. The Court was 
inactive for the first three years as most cases’ adjudication took place within 
the Commission38 and it was not until 1961 that it deliberated over its first 
case.39 The two part supervisory organs were later replaced by one supervisory 
mechanism; the European Court of Human Rights [hereafter the Court] in 1998 
following the adoption of the Eleventh Protocol to the Convention.40 The 
role of the Court as defined in article 19, ECHR is ‘to ensure the 
observance of the engagements undertaken by the High Contracting Parties in 
the Convention and the Protocols hereto’. In other words, it acts as a 
supranational judicial review on the interpretation and application on the 
Convention. 41 Currently the Strasbourg Court is composed of 47 judges 
and is reflective of the membership of the countries in the Council of Europe42 
[hereafter the COE]. Additionally another judge will join to reflect the 
accession of the European Union to the ECHR. 4 3  An additional  
approximately 650 people work in Registry representing several 
professionals. Despite this large staff, however; the number of applications 
is huge. Indications of 60,000 new cases came to the Court in 2010, 
notwithstanding 40,000 cases of inadmissibility and judgments judged on the 
merits alone.44 
33 Steven Greer – Constitutionalizing adjudication under the European Convention on 
Human Rights, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, pp. 404 
34 Marks Susan “The European Convention on Human Rights and its Democratic Society” 
66 British Yearbook of International Law [1996] 209- 238, pp. 214 
35 Wicks “The UK Government’s Perceptions of the European Convention on Human 
Rights at the Time of Entry”, Public Law [2000] pp. 445-446 
36 Lord Denning remarked in his writings - What next in Law? [1982] ‘Do not let us be 
bound by decisions of judges who do not know our way of life nor anything of our common 
law’ 
37 Hon. Mr. Justice John Murray ”The Influence of the European Convention on Human 
Rights on Community Law, Fordham International Law Journal [2011] Vol 33 Issue 5, 
Article 3 pp. 1391
  21 
The problem of what is referred to as the docket crisis is one that has grown to 
be worrisome. If one looks to determine where the problem derives, arguably 
the factor that recurs is that of the enlargement of the Council of Europe. 
Another factor that is imminent in the crisis can be awarded to article 39 of 
the Convention. The provision within the Convention allows for 
individuals to apply directly to the Court for redress in matters of human 
rights infringements. Initially this provision is one that is celebrated as the 
Convention is the first treaty granting individuals a right of petition before a 
general human rights treaty45. However with the growing pressure faced 
by the Court, some concerns imply the provision to be a contributory factor. 
a) The right to Individual Petitioning 
The right to individual petitioning as contained within the article 39 of the 
provision paved the way for an important aspect of the changing structure of 
International law by focusing on individual rights.46 The importance of the 
right to individual petitioning is discussed further below in this subsection 
as well some of the concerns accompanying this in recent debates. It is 
prominently debated that the Strasbourg Court is now under pressure due to 
its enormous and ever growing workload. The backlog of cases and delays in 
adjudicating cases is portraying the Court as a victim of its own success.
47
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
38 Former European Commission of Human Rights part of the two-part supervisory 
mechanism that was replaced by European Court of Human Rights 
39 This was the case of Lawless v Ireland (No.3) App. No. 332/57 on the 1
st 
July 1961 
40 Protocol No.11 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, Restructuring the Control Machinery Established thereby article 1, May 11, 
1994, 2061-A2889 U.N.T.S 7 adopted but came into force 1998 
41 Article 32, ECHR (formerly known as Article 45) 
42 Article 20 of the Convention 
43 Jean Paul Costa (Former Judge and President of the European Court of Human Rights) – 
Current Challenges for the European Court of Human Rights, Leiden Law School [2011] – 
A Raymond and Beverly Sackler Distinguished Lecture in Human Rights 
44 Ibid. 43, pp.10 
45 Ibid.44, 
46 Wolfgang Friedmann – The Changing Structure of International Law [1964] Columbia 
University Press pp.40 - 44
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There has been an increase in the requests for interim measures in order to 
prevent irreversible situations. The impact of this is a very harmful 
predicament for victims to find themselves in.
48
Victims’ right for a fair and 
speedy trial before a judge is impaired by administrative difficulties. 
Concerns emerged of the increased use of the procedure within 
article 39, claiming that applicants who fail to gain desired effects within 
national jurisdictions use the mechanism to get the Court’s attention. The 
result of this is pointed out by a scholar who states that, in such situations, the 
Court ceases to act as second guarantor of human rights and instead finds 
itself in a more crucial and exposed frontline position.
49
 Others attributed 
the increase in more use of the right to individual petitioning to the 
enlargement of the Council of Europe. The enlargement saw the accession of 
former central eastern European countries recovering from the aftermaths of a 
Communist era, who also at the time of accession were deemed not up to the 
expected standards of democracy and the rule of law as required by the 
Council of Europe
50
. The effect this in turn has had is that systemic 
problems within these countries are now brought to the attention of the 
Court by nationals within these jurisdictions because of the possibility for 
redress available that perhaps was not as imminent before these countries 
acceded into the Council of Europe. This has led some scholars to view that 
Court as becoming increasing constitutional in its role as a supervisory 
mechanism.
51 
 
 
47 Marie Benedict Dembour – Finishing of Cases; The Radical Solution to the Problem of 
the Expanding European Court of Human Rights Caseload, European Law Review [2002] 
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49 Harmsen Robert, ‘The European Convention of Human Rights after Enlargement’ (2001) 
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50 Sadurski, Wojciech, ‘Partnering with Strasbourg: Constitutionalisation of Human Rights, 
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51 Ibid. 50 
52 Steven Greer – Constitutionalizing adjudication under the European Convention on 
Human Rights, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 405 [ 2003] pp. 406 – 07 
53 See Murray - The Influence of the European Convention of Human Rights on Community 
Law, Fordham International Law Journal [2011] Volume 33 Issue 5 , Article 3 pp141 5
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b) The Bilateral Function of the Court 
This section looks at the difficulty faced by the Strasbourg Court in role of 
balancing the notion of individual justice with that of bringing about 
uniform standards amongst the European public order 
The role of the Court emerges in two parts; firstly, it offers 
individuals justice as a source of redress for victims whose rights within the 
Convention have been infringed. Secondly, it serves as a source of 
constitutional justice by safeguarding and developing rules within the 
Convention.
52
 The Court has the purpose of bringing about uniform 
standards of rights protection across Europe.
53
 This is the consensus 
doctrine; whereby the Courts seeks to maintain minimum standards of rights 
protection across Europe and base such considerations by examining the 
Convention right in question before them.
54
The Court also functions within 
an international framework and must operate within the bounds of 
international law. It also has duties reflecting those similar to a 
constitutional court.
55
 This is a claim brought on by its use of the consensus 
doctrine when seeking to harmonise minimum standards of rights protection 
within the European public order. The consensus doctrine has resulted in 
allowing the Courts to increasing impact on domestic legal orders through 
its judgments. 
The Court is increasingly criticised as acting rather like a 
fourth instance court. The fourth instance doctrine is one that is best 
understood in conjunction with article 6 (1) of the Convention. In other 
words, the Court when deciding admissibility of a case, it must review the 
issue of fairness in procedural terms. The issue of procedural fairness relates 
to the concept of equal arms whereby on a practical level, adversarial 
proceedings occur on an equal footing, no one party should be unfairly 
disadvantaged.
56
 It is through application of article 6(1) in conjunction with 
article 35 that criticism of the Court acting as a fourth instance has emerged. 
Further critique of the Court in this respect derives the content within 
provision 3 5(3) of the Convention. The provision makes it clear that;; ‘the 
Court shall declare inadmissible applications submitted under the right to 
individual petitioning it if considers such applications to be incompatible 
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with the provisions of the Convention and the Protocols thereto ad should 
review these as an abuse of the right of individual petition.
57
 It is from this 
provision that national authorities insist that the Court makes it clear that is 
not a fourth instance court that squash rulings given by the domestic courts. 
It is this increasing deliberation and adjudication on major constitutional 
controversies involving rights within Contracting Parties 
58
that bore the 
need for the above reminder towards the Court. 
The Strasbourg Court in their judicial precedent
59
 seem to indicate an 
differing stance of what their role as a supervisory mechanism The case 
law dictates the Convention’s interpretation as a constitutional instrument 
of the European public order.
60
 By this, they indicate that the 
Convention portrays the special character as a treaty for the collective 
enforcement of human rights and fundamental freedoms; which creates 
over and above a network of mutual bilateral undertakings, objective 
obligations which in the words of the preamble benefit from a 
‘collective enforcement’.61 The Court adheres therefore towards this 
public order by standardizing the balance between judicial review and 
deference to the domestic lawmakers. 
The Court is adamant in contending that its two main 
objectives when applying the Convention arguably are seeking 
harmonisation through the principle of commonality, which materialises in 
uniform standards of principles that allow for effective human rights 
protection. 
 
 
 
 
54 Stated by Court in Tyrer v UK [1978] Para 15 whereby: they examined the intrinsic 
nature of the punishment at issue and realm of protection of article 3, ECHR 
55 Ernst Ulrich Petersmann – Human Rights, International Economic Law and 
Constitutional Justice 19 European Journal of International Law 769 [2008] pp. 777 - 78 
56 See Garcia Ruiz v Spain GC [1996] App. No 30544/96 Para 28 – 29 
57 Perlata v Greece no. 17721/ 04 [2007] Para 25 
58 Ibid. 113 Fordham pp. 1417 
59 Loizidou v Turkey [1995] 
60 Ibid.56, Para 27 
61 Ibid.57
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The secondary aim arguably is that of pluralism whereby democracy, 
subsidiarity and variety is maintained.
62
 The pursuit of both these aims 
whilst applying the Convention is what has led to the development of 
greater critique towards the supervisory mechanism. The balancing of these 
two objectives is a difficult task and some view the methods of the Court as 
inconsistent and obscure.
63
 This common critique is evident in regards to the 
application and interpretation of the margin of appreciation doctrine, which 
allows for the objective of pluralism. 
It is through the exercise of these main responsibilities that the 
Court has gradually received increasing criticism. The two major critiques 
are judicial activism on one hand and excessive self-restraint on the other. In 
the first critique, two main arguments exist, on one hand national judicial 
systems feel unsupported by the Court when adjudication on domestic 
matters. On the other hand, High Contracting parties feel that certain matters 
remain the responsibility of their governments and Parliament. The two 
claims can be translated into a approaching the issue of human rights as a 
discourse from differing perspectives. High Contracting parties take the 
stance of cultural relativism by approaching human rights protection in a 
manner that allows each national jurisdiction to decide what constitutes a 
human rights problem or issue. The Court however seems to approach the 
issue of human rights from a universal perspective. In other words, the case 
law of the Court indicates an acceptance of a minimum level and standard of 
uniform rights, this approach could very well explain the eagerness of the 
Court to encompass human rights matters in extended matters that may not 
have previously been labeled as being human rights oriented. On the other 
hand, the theory of evolutionary interpretation by the Court might indicate 
that the human rights discourse is ever growing and changing. This in turn 
indicates that society, international as well as regional wise is placing more 
issues and questions in the realm of human rights tying the Court to address 
such issues as human rights concerns. 
 
62 Ibid.58, pp. 20-2 1 
63 Ibid. 59, pp. 5
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Nevertheless irrespective of the rationale as to why the Court has developed 
and applied the Convention in recent year. By failing to support decisions 
taken at national level, Contracting Parties feel that the Court acts as a fourth 
instance court, acting outside its mandate and thus exercising judicial 
activism by going beyond set parameters of its power. 
The rationale for increased critique towards the Strasbourg 
Court emerged post 2001 when the fight against terrorism became priority 
to many of the High Contracting Parties. Furthermore, the economic crisis 
has led to a shift in priority from human rights development to place it on 
economic policies. The aftermath of 2001 has also resulted in a spread in 
Euro-centrism, which calls for a reduction in the popularity in the human 
rights discourse. It is harder for recipients’ within national borders to accept 
the Court’s point of view which is to treat ‘all human beings as equal’ 
especially towards the unpopular categories i.e. prisoners, criminals, asylum 
seekers, migrants and people belonging to minorities.
64
 This poses the 
difficult but much relevant question of ‘how may one reconcile the basic 
elements of the European system i.e. the right to individual petition within 
the requirements of an efficient but speedy justice.
65
 
National authorities on the other hand refer to this implicit 
reference of principle of subsidiarity inherent within the Convention as 
justification of the discretion accorded to States to interpret and implement 
human rights. There is an insistence on their part that, the principle of 
subsidiarity inherent within the provisions arguably provides a basis for 
determining the appropriate limits of that latitude requiring justification of 
any intervention and assistance.
66
 
It would seem that critique from High Contracting Parties 
derives from the requirement that the process of bringing about uniform 
standards of human rights protection and seeking harmonisation within 
Europe should be gradual. This seems particularly relevant if one looks at 
the legal framework of International law, in particular that of the 
Convention whose foundation is dependent upon the consent of High 
Contracting Parties.
67
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In other words, the speed in which changes and developments of rights is 
occurring at the hands of the Court, is startling to national authorities who do 
not feel part of such a process. Debatably, national authorities feel like 
bystanders in a system to which they are equally entitled to take part in 
and dictate in matters of direction and implementation. The issue seems to 
come down to balance. Human rights protection and implementation within 
the Convention requires these form both actor, the Court and High 
Contracting Parties. The issue of balance between the Court and national 
authorities seems particularly important if provided by the principle of 
subsidiarity for the effective application of the Convention. It is apparent that 
the aim of effecting rights within the Convention is not achievable through 
the Court alone. Furthermore while States may be in a better position to 
deliver the first line of protection, they at times require the guidance and 
support of the Court in doing so. 
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3 Exercise and Development of Subsidiarity 
through the European Court Case Law 
This chapter complements the previous section by illustrating the 
relationship between the Court and High Contracting Parties and some of 
the issues that accompany this. Furthermore the chapter outlines the role 
played by national authorities in applying the Convention. This section of 
the thesis also explores the way subsidiarity as a principal embeds within 
the Convention system. In other words, it seeks to examine some of the 
ways in which subsidiarity as a principle exists currently with the ECHR. 
There are two types of the principle of subsidiarity that manifest within the 
Convention. Firstly there is procedural subsidiarity; referring to the working 
relationship between the Court and national authorities regarding the 
division of responsibility for action and intervention. Secondly, there is 
substantive subsidiarity; that governs the relative responsibility for decision-
making and assessment.
68
 The chapter discusses both. Before doing so 
however an introduction into the main bodies responsible for the application 
of the Convention is warranted and some points of reference towards the 
relation enjoyed by these parties will be explored. 
The responsibility for human rights protection within the 
ECHR framework subsists between the supervisory mechanism, the Court 
and the High Contracting parties. Within the Convention, Article 1 and 13 
of the Convention lays primary responsibility for securing rights and 
freedoms provided for in the Convention with domestic authorities together 
with the obligation to make effective remedies available.
69
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
68 Ibid. 60, Para 22 
69 Steven Greer – The Margin of Appreciation; Interpretation and Discretion under the 
European Convention on Human Rights , Human Rights Files No.17 [2000] pp 19-20
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The provisions of article 1, 13 together with that of article 35 are vital in the 
discussion below as they possess the inference implicit within the Convention 
towards the subsidiarity as a guiding principle. Also within the same 
instrument, we find the purpose of the supervisory mechanism stated within 
Article 19 as one that complements the role of High Contracting Parties 
through review by the Court and allows for ‘the observance of the 
engagements by the domestic authorities of the rules contained within the 
Convention’. The subsection below will review how this relationship 
materialises through the principle of subsidiarity. 
1. Procedural Subsidiarity through the Admissibility 
Criteria 
The chapter highlights further the relationship between the supervisory 
mechanism and the High Contracting Parties. The debate in this section 
highlights the role that article 35 plays as manifestation for the existing 
principle of subsidiarity within the Convention.  Article 35 of the 
Convention states;; ‘ the Court may only deal with the matter after all 
domestic remedies have been exhausted according to the generally 
recognised rules of International Law and within a period of six months 
from the date on which final decision was taken. 
70 
The rule contains the 
obligation to exhaust all domestic remedies and forms part of 
international customary law.
71
 The provision embodies the principle of 
subsidiarity and grants national authorities the primary right in 
implementing the Convention. It allows national authorities the 
opportunity to prevent or put right the alleged violations of the 
Convention.
72
 Article 35 embodies what can be referred to as the implicit 
reference towards the principle of subsidiarity. By implicit, the author is 
referring to the fact that the provision makes no specific reference to the 
concept of subsidiarity. Nevertheless, once read, the provision is the 
embodiedment of what the concept of subsidiarity is all about.  
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The rule within the provisions of article 35 is procedural in nature as it 
requires victims who wish to claim redress for rights violation to so 
national first and exhaust all required domestic procedures before moving 
on to apply to the Strasbourg Court for redress. 
The rule bases its purpose on the assumption reflected within article 13 
of the Convention; that domestic legal orders provide an effective remedy for 
the violations of the Convention rights.
73
 Applicants must avail themselves of 
any procedural means, starting with those within their domestic 
jurisdiction.
74
 Article 35 rules however do allow for some degree of 
flexibility as illustrated by adjudication of case law pertaining to this provision 
within the Court. The notion of procedural subsidiarity contained within 
article 35 is one that interplays with the principle of effectiveness. The 
principle of effectiveness
75
 is one that requires the Convention to be effective 
in theory and practice. The Court therefore allows room for flexibility due to 
the objective of protecting human rights.
76
 In other words, despite the 
existence of article 3 5(1) that obliges applicants to exhaust domestic 
procedures, adherence to the rule contained in the provision is flexible and 
allows the Court to rule on the effectiveness of the domestic remedies as 
provided by the national authorities.
77
 The impact of this interplay reflects 
further within article 46(1) of the Convention. The article obliges High 
Contracting Parties to abide by the final judgments of the Court in any cases 
to which they are party. This is particularly relevant whereby there is a 
systemic or structural problem, with regard to the observance of a particular 
Convention right. Especially if the structural issue is capable of producing a 
de fact erga omnes effect, which requires the participation of all branches of 
State for an effective remedy. 
78
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The importance of article 35 is that it allows for the distribution of 
proof between the applicant and the respondent State. Respondent State 
claiming non-exhaustion must satisfy to the Court that the remedy was 
effective and available in theory and practice. It has to be accessible and 
capable of providing redress in respect to the applicant’s complaints 
and offer reasonable prospects of success.
79
 The Court reviews adherence 
to the rule within article 35(1) through regard of the particular circumstances 
of each individual case.
80
  
 
Consequently, the Court takes realistic account of the existence 
of formal remedies in the legal system of the Contracting Party concerned. 
It also reviews the general legal and political context in which they 
operate.
81
 Article 35 is illustrative of the complex relationship that the 
Court and national authorities’ enjoy. So while article 1 and 13 
together with article 35 of the Convention lay the primary responsibility 
for securing rights with domestic authorities thus embodying what is 
referred to as the implicit reference to the principle of subsidiarity within 
the Convention. Article 35 arguably go further by observing the purpose of 
article 19, which allows for review of the action or omission taken by 
Contracting Parties when implementing the Convention domestically. 
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2. Substantive Subsidiarity within the Margin of Appreciation 
This section looks to examine further the relationship between the Court and 
High Contraction Parties. It discusses another rule contained within the 
Convention that lays the basis for the principle of subsidiarity and looks to 
review the role awarded High Contracting Parties through the implicit 
application of subsidiarity when applying and implementing the 
Convention. 
Article 1 of the Convention places primary responsibility for 
the implementation of the Convention with High Contracting Parties; the 
result is that States enjoy a certain margin of appreciation that gives them 
the discretion to decide the choice of means to be utilised in its domestic 
legal system for the performance of their obligations under the Convention. 
The margin of appreciation doctrine illustrates the manifestation of the 
substantive subsidiarity as applied in limitation and derogation cases. 
Arguably, it is the cornerstone of the Convention’s respect for diversity of 
the Nations within the Council of Europe’s human rights system. The scope 
of the margin of appreciation makes a clear example of the structural 
incorporation of the local discretion into legal doctrines of international human 
rights law. 
82
 Some scholars view the doctrine as essential in avoiding 
confrontations because it allows for the flexibility in balancing the interest 
of maintaining the Sovereignty of Member States whilst complying with 
their obligations under the Convention.
83
 Arguably, the margin of 
appreciation doctrine is the tool that defines relations between the domestic 
authorities and the Court.
84
 The rights contained within the Convention are 
divisible into two categories, absolute rights and non-absolute therefore 
limited rights. The absolute rights are those that High Contracting Parties 
must be in compliance with always and are non- derogable under Article 
15.
85
 Article 15 relates to the right of State Parties to derogate from some of 
the rights contained within the Convention in matters of national 
emergencies relating to the security of the Nation. 
 
 
The first category of non-absolute rights can be divided into rights that are 
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non-absolute due to the nature of the right in question and those rights 
whereby the extent of the limitation is laid down within the provisions relating 
to that particular right. An example of such a right where limitation is contained 
within is that of article 2. This provision refers to the right to life and states 
that “everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law”. The sub paragraph 
of this right lays down conditions upon which infringement of this right is 
not contrary to principles within the Convention. 
86 It states that “no one shall 
be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a 
court following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided 
by law”. Finally there is conditions of the circumstances in which the right 
may be legally restricted. 
The second group of non-absolute rights is where the right 
itself is limited due to the nature of the right. The margin of appreciation 
doctrine is concerned with these rights. Examples of such rights are 
contained within article 8 – 11 but are not limited to only these rights as 
rights within the subsequent rights within the Protocols of the Convention 
also may follow the same structure and there become defined as limited due 
to their very nature.
87
 Article 8 relates to the eight to respect for private and 
family life. Article 9 refers to the freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion. Article 10 in turn points to the freedom of expression. Finally 
article 11 relates to the freedom of assembly and association. The structure 
of such rights is similar; whereby the provision starts by stating the right 
itself. The sub paragraph then lays down conditions for any form of 
interference and lastly the acceptable conditions for justification of 
interference of any such right. The margin of appreciation is applicable here 
because, interference of the rights occurs by High Contracting Parties and it 
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is up to the relevant Party to then be able to determine when to interfere 
with a right but also have a satisfactory justification for doing so. The 
formula for the Court not to find a violation of such a right usually is; that a 
State Party has to provide satisfactory answers to all three elements of the 
right. The three elements are as following, firstly; Is the interference in 
accordance with the law, secondly; is this interference in pursuit of a 
legitimate aim and lastly; is it necessary in a democratic society. It is worth 
mentioning that in most of these cases, the third and last category is one that 
is most difficult for State Parties to prove to the Court as satisfactory and 
mostly leads to the finding of a violation. In assessing this, the Court looks 
to consider national as well as local particularities of the case and looks to 
determine if a consensus exists on the specific issue amongst Contracting 
States. 88 
The Court recognises the importance of the doctrine as illustrated in 
the Handyside judgement89 whereby they held that ‘domestic authorities are 
better placed than an international court to interpret domestic law in 
correspondence with obligations under the Convention.90 However the 
court has also go on to maintain that doctrine is one that goes hand in hand 
with European supervision and that final determination of the obligations 
under the Convention rests with the Strasbourg Court. It is this analysis of the 
margin of appreciation that has over the years led to dissatisfaction within 
High Contracting Parties, who view the Courts methods in supervising the 
doctrine as inconsistent and obscure.91  
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national systems safeguarding human rights’. 
91
Steven Greer – The Margin of Appreciation; Interpretation and Discretion under the 
European Convention on Human Rights [2000] pp. 5 
92 The Convention as a Subsidiary Source of Laweech by Michael O’Boyle, Deputy 
Registrar of the European Court of Human Rights, Sp, 1-2 October 2010 Delivered at 
the conference on subsidiarity, 1-2 October 2010 in Skopje see the Committee on Legal Affairs 
and Human Rights, Contribution to the Conference on the Principle of Subsidiarity, Skopje, 1-2 
October 2010 “Strengthening Subsidiarity: Integrating the Strasbourg Court’s Case law into 
National Law and Judicial Practice” Presentation by Mr Chr istos Pourgourides, 
Chairperson of the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights (AS/Jur), Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe accessed via http://assembly.coe.int/CommitteeDocs/201 
0/20101125 _skopje.pdf 
93 Hirst v UK No.2, GC Judgement App. No. 74025/01 [2005]
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The relationship between the Court and national authorities through the 
manifestation of subsidiarity allows the Convention to act as the central 
nerve system by which common legal standards are set which permeate the 
legal orders of the Contracting States in its role as primary protectors of 
human rights.92 
a) Limitation of the Margin of Appreciation Doctrine Case 
Study 1 – Hirst 
This sub-section looks into Hirst93; a case illustrative of the limitations of 
the margin of appreciation doctrine. The case is important because it 
highlights some of the challenges faced by the Court in applying implicit 
subsidiarity. The case exemplifies the critique posed by some High 
Contracting Parties towards the Court and shows the path towards need for 
reform within the European Human Rights system. In the section some 
details of the case are present as well as the Court’s analysis together with 
other commentary and critique born out of the executed judgment. 
Hirst was a convicted prisoner for manslaughter on grounds of 
diminished responsibility, a defence under UK law for the crime of murder. 
He complained that the bar by section 3 of the Representation of the People 
Act 1983 of convicted prisoners from voting in parliamentary or local 
elections, issued proceedings was incompatible with the European 
Convention on Human Rights. He urged the High Court to declare the rule 
as incompatible under section 3 of the Human Rights Act.
94
 The case went 
as far as exhausting all domestic remedies, deliberation within the UK 
Supreme Court revealed not to find the automatic blanket ban as 
inconsistent with the HRA. The case went on the Strasbourg Court 
highlighting the right to vote for convicted prisoners and related to 
obligations within article 3, Protocol No.1 of the Convention [hereafter 
article 3]. The provision contains obligations for High Contracting Parties to 
hold elections in order to ensure the free expression of the opinion of 
people. 
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The Court has found the rule to imply individual rights pertaining to the 
right to vote and the right to stand for election.
95
 In this particular case, the 
Court agreed that the right as contained within article 3 was not absolute and 
left room for implied limitations and opportunity for the Contracting Parties 
to exercise the doctrine of margin of appreciation, indeed a wide one.
96
 They 
concluded that given the variety in electoral systems and wealth of 
differences in historical developments, cultural diversity and political 
thought, each Contracting Party should mould the right into their own 
democratic vision.
97
 The Court also pointed out that the last review of 
whether in exercising this doctrine, requirements of the right, in this case, 
article 3 uphold, lies with the supervisory mechanism. It is up to the Court to 
ensure the restrictions on a right do not impair the essence or deprive the right 
of its effectiveness and that restrictions pursue a legitimate aim and not 
considered as disproportionate.
98
 
Following the line of reasoning, what is interesting is that the Court 
held that; the restriction on convicted prisoners losing their right to vote 
pursues a legitimate aim representing retribution and deterrence. It however 
found that an automatic blanket ban imposed on all prisoners was arbitrary in 
the effects. It relayed concerns of the national piece of legislation
99
, by 
referring to it as a blunt instrument that strips prisoners of their Convention 
right to vote and does so indiscriminately.
100
 The Court therefore found a 
violation of the rights as contained in article 3, Protocol 1 of the 
Convention
101
. It found that the lack of distinguishing between different 
kinds of prisoners, nature or gravity of crime or sentence of offence to 
result in such a general, automatic and indiscriminate restriction on a 
vitally important Convention right. It viewed such a restriction as falling 
outside any acceptable margin of appreciation, however wide that margin 
might be.
102 
 
94 The Human Rights Act 1998 [hereafter the HRA] is the domestic legislation through 
which the Convention has been incorporated with the UK domestic legal order. S. 4 (2) of 
the HRA reads: ‘If the court is satisfied that the provision is incompatible with a 
Convention right, it may make a declaration of that incompatibility’. 
95 Ibid. 90, Hirst Para 56- 57 
96 Ibid. 95, Hirst Para 60 - 61 
97 Ibid. 96, Hirst Para 61 
98 Ibid. 97, Hirst Para 62 see Mathieu – Mohin and Clerfayt v Belgium [1987] Series A No, 
113 pp. 23 Para 52
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Critique of the judgment was evident firstly the dissenting opinion of one of 
the judges. Judge Jean Paul Costa argued that, ‘if the Court accepts the 
wide margin of appreciation to decide on aims of any restriction, limitation or 
even outright ban on the right to vote.
103
 It appears inconsistent if it later 
decides to reduce that margin when it came to assessing proportionality of 
the measure of restricting universal suffrage, which in itself is a democratic 
idea and therefore aspiration as a goal for Europe.
104
 The reality that Hirst 
illustrates is that an implied theoretical wide margin of appreciation exists 
within the Convention.  
 
Nevertheless, by finding a violation of the right, the Court deprives 
Contracting Parties of all margin and all means of appreciation.
105
 Other 
critique materialised within the respondent State whereby the Head of State 
promised to uphold the views of the British people over those of the 
Strasbourg Court
106
. Others have not been as diplomatic and in response to 
the judgment called for an outright defiance of the Court’s judgement.107 It did 
not help matters that subsequent case law
108
 regarding similar issues before 
the Court is receiving the same executed judgments. 
 
 
 
99 Section 3A of the Representation of the People Act 1983, 1983 Chapter 2 
100 Ibid. 98, Hirst pp. 17 Para 82 
101 Protocol No. 01 to the Convention, Paris 20. III. [1952] Article 3 relates to Right to free 
elections and reads: The High Contracting Parties undertake to hold free elections at 
reasonable intervals by secret ballot, under conditions, which will ensure the free 
expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature.  
102 Ibid. 100, Hirst Para 82 
103 Hilbe v Lichtenstein [1999] ,ECHR 1999-IV 
104 Dissenting Opinion of Jean Paul Costa in Hirst Judgement of the Grand Chamber Para 5 
105 Ibid.104, Para 9 
106 House of Commons, Question Time – Response from David Cameron on Wednesday 
24 October [2012] H. C. Debs. 23 May 2012, col. 1127 accessed via: 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmhansrd/cm121024/debtext/121024- 
0001 .htm 
107 Letter to Daily Mail ( a national tabloid) newspaper by Jack Straw (Shadow Justice 
secretary and Lord Chancellor) and David Davis (Minister of Parliament) accessible via: 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/law-and-order/9287633/We-must-defy-
Strasbourg-on-prisoner-votes.html  
108 Greens and MT V UK App. No. 6004 1/08 7 App. No. 60054/08 / Scoppola v. Italy (No. 
3), Application No. 126/05 [2012]
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The Court has again attempted to maintain the relationship between itself and 
Contracting Parties on the matter. It therefore concedes that;; ‘the Contracting 
States may decide either to leave it to the courts to determine the 
proportionality of a measure restricting convicted prisoners’ voting rights, 
or to incorporate provisions into their laws defining the circumstances in 
which such a measure should be applied. In this latter case, it will be for the 
legislature itself to balance the competing interests in order to avoid any 
general, automatic and indiscriminate restriction.
109
 In the same instance, 
however it has gone on to maintain that it will still be the role of the Court to 
examine whether, in a given case, this result achieved and whether the 
wording of the law, or the judicial decision complies with Article 3 of 
Protocol No. 1.
110 
The aftermath of this judgment is one that has further 
cemented the relationship between Strasbourg and some Contracting Parties 
as fragile at the best. This case is particularly important also because the 
respondent state within these proceedings, the United Kingdom also held the 
Chair for the Council of Europe at the time when the new reforms were 
proposed and established. Presumably the case may have warranted a specious 
mode of action for reforms to take place within the Council of Europe in 
order to avoid similar circumstances as those highlighted by the case 
above. 
b) Limitation of the Margin of Appreciation Doctrine Case 
Study 2 – The Othman Case 
This sub-section illustrates another case study that offers insight into the 
complex task performed by the Strasbourg Court and the effects this has on 
its relationship with High Contracting Parties. The case is particularly 
important because is also illustrates the limits that the existing manifestation 
of the principle of subsidiarity has in the current Convention system. 
This is a case
111
 that concerned the deportation of a terror 
suspect from the UK to Jordan, Mr. Othman. Othman entered the UK as a 
refugee who received temporal stay of four years. He later applied for 
indefinite leave to remain and it was pending this that he later was arrested 
on suspicion for terrorism and served with an order for deportation.  
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He challenged this order on the basis that should he return to Jordan, he feared 
facing torture and retrial for charges of terrorism to which he already had 
been convicted absentia in Jordan. He claimed a violation of article 3
112 
and 
6 of the Convention. This article of the Convention concerns the right to be 
promptly brought before the judge for s fair and impartial hearing into your 
case. 
The Court in this case held that ‘it is a legitimate aim for Contracting 
Parties to take a firm stand against those who contribute to terrorist acts.
1
 
13
It 
went on to state that it is however not its function to review whether an 
individual is in fact such a threat. Its task is to consider whether the individual’s 
deportation would be compatible with his or her rights under the 
Convention.
114
 The Court noted the nature of article 3 as absolute and not 
weighable against the reasons put forward for the expulsion.115 When 
examining whether the applicant would face a real risk of ill-treatment in 
Jordan, the Court reviewed the general human rights situation in the country 
and the particular circumstances of the applicant. The picture painted by 
NGOs and UN bodies was consistent and disturbing. UN CAT committee 
described the practice of torture as widespread and routine in its report to the 
Court.116 The Court in this case, however found that deportation would not 
be contrary to article 3 of the Convention as long as effective safeguards such 
as diplomatic assurances were in place. In this particular respect, the UK and 
Jordan have gone ahead to sign a diplomatic agreement for this particular 
case.117 Advancement in the case is that upon ratification, the applicant in this 
case has hinted at possible voluntary return 
to Jordan.118 
 
109
Ibid. 102, see Scoppola v. Italy (No. 3), Application No. 126/05 [2012] Para 102  
110 Ibid. 109 
111 Othman (Abu Quatada) v UK App. No. 8139/09 [2012] 
112 Article 3 of the Convention relates to the Prohibition of torture, inhumane and degrading 
treatment 
113 Ibid.112, Para 183 
114 Ibid.113, Para 184
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Further issues of dissatisfaction by there again the United Kingdom, who are 
the respondent State in the issue, arose however, when the Court then turned 
its attention towards compatibility of the deportation with article 6 of the 
Convention. The Court held that a violation of Article 6 would occur if 
deportation occurs because this in turn would place the applicant in a situation 
of denial of procedural justice. The Court labeled this denial of justice as” 
flagrant” by applying a stringent test of unfairness. They defined flagrant as 
denial of justice that goes beyond mere irregularities or lack of safeguards 
in the trial procedures. The inclusion of torture is an example of such denial 
that might result in a breach of Article 6 as if occurring within the 
Contracting State itself.119  
The concern was that the applicant had been convicted absentia on 
charges of terrorism. Evidence supporting the charges was testimony obtained 
from his co-defendants through the method of torture. They reiterated the 
importance of the trial process as the cornerstone for the rule of law. 
They held that torture evidence is damaging to such a process and tainting 
towards the reputation of any court that admits it. They established that “no 
legal system based upon the rule of law can countenance the admission of 
evidence that has been obtained by such a barbaric practice as torture.120 
Therefore, for these reasons, the Court concluded that the deportation 
would be incompatible with the rights contained within article 6 of the 
Convention. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
115 Ibid.1 14,Para 185 see Saadi v Italy GC App. No. 37201/06 Para 125 & 138 [2008]  
116 Ibid.115, Para 187 see Para 156 for the UN CAT Report 
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This case is significant because it is the first case whereby the Court has found 
that expulsion of respondent State would be contrary to article 6 rights within 
the Convention. It is illustrative of the ways in which human rights 
adjudication by the Court has developed to extend into matters previously 
considered as domestic, such as the right for states to decide who to receive 
in their territory. Development of migrant rights has been imminent 
within articles 2 and 3 and this case is illustrative of how article 6 can also 
contribute to developing rights for this group. Human rights defenders might 
praise this development but the acknowledgement from High Contracting 
parties towards this development is one that is in indignation. The case is 
illustrative of the concern by national authorities that the Court is acting as a 
fourth instance court whereby parties within national jurisdiction dissatisfied 
with decisions seek appeal to the Court using the Convention in matters that 
should remain national concerns. This claim is consistent with issues pertaining 
to immigration law; whereby an emergence of rights for immigrants and 
asylum seekers are materialising through adjudication on other concerns 
before the Court. 
c) The Right to an effective remedy – Combined efforts for 
procedural and substantive subsidiarity 
This sub-section highlights the role that subsidiarity plays in encouraging 
national systems to effectively implement measures that allow for rights 
protection in practice. It will discuss the rule contained within article 13 of 
the Convention and outline its usefulness in assisting national authorities in 
the role. 
Article 13 states that “everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this 
Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national 
authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons 
acting in an official capacity”. It embodied victim’s right to an effective 
remedy upon infringement of their rights under the Convention. Early 
interpretation of article 13 by the ECtHR is narrow, illustrated by the 
reluctance for the Court to mandate the incorporation of the Convention 
within domestic orders or demand that ‘effective’ translates to judicial 
remedies.
121
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More recently, however the court has aimed to deliver individual justice; 
thereby delivering human rights adjudication in a manner whereby it insists on 
every genuine victim receiving redress or remedy, whatever the bureaucratic 
cost, and despite the likely impact that such a judgment may have on the 
conduct or practice in question.
122
 This has translated in article 13 
materialising as a guarantee of one of the most fundamental principles of a 
democratic society.
123
 This is the right to an effective remedy. Despite its 
attempts to full interpret and make use of the provision, some scholars find the 
Court’s reluctance or unwillingness to identify specific remedies as impeding 
the process of speedy and full compliance of the execution of their 
judgements.
124
 Other scholars see the potential development of article 13 as 
still high especially through further interpretation of other rights.
125
 The 
Court for instance could define the type of investigations or compensatory 
relief required for differing Convention violations and create standards that 
must be satisfied for domestic remedies to qualify as effective.
126
 
 
The Court has in recent years extended its interpretation of the 
article to require specific, certain types of remedies provided by national 
authorities for them to satisfy the ‘effective’ criteria.127 It has stated that 
article 13 requires the government to carry out a rigorous and independent 
scrutiny of the applicant’s claims.128 It analyses the satisfaction of the 
effectiveness criteria through a detailed scrutiny of the domestic measures in 
place. Ironically complaint of heavy burdens and workload on judicial 
systems have not deterred the Court from placing a duty on State Parties to 
ensure through organisation that domestic judicial systems can meet the 
requirements of article 13.
129 
 
 
121 Laurence Helfer – Redesigning the ECHR- ’Embeddedness as a deep structural 
principle of the European Human Rights Regime , EJIL [2008] Volume 19 No.1 pp 147 see 
also Swedish Engine Drivers Union v Sweden [1984] Para 50 
122 Ibid.121, pp. 139 See also Greer at 191 
123 Conka v Belgium App. No. 5 1564/99 Para 83 
124 Ibid. 121, pp. 147; see also European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice 
Commission) Up. No. 209/2002 [2002] accessed via 
http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/CDL-AD(2002)034.aspx 
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The Court acknowledges adequate redress as essential to decrease individual 
applications through article 34. More importantly, it has stated the importance 
of the provision in enhancing the principle of subsidiarity. Article 13 
requires the reshaping of national systems to increase the likelihood of 
human rights as remedied at home. This the Court acknowledge as essential in 
tackling its own problem of heavy workload due to the increase in 
individual applications.
130
 
Scholars
131
 have recommended for article 13 to require 
‘effective’ to encompass judicial remedies. This would grant jurisdiction to 
all domestic courts to consider complaints about the violation of Convention 
standards and provide individuals with complaints procedures.
132
 The Group 
of Wise Persons has previously recommended adoption of a protocol that 
obligates Member States to introduce domestic legal mechanisms and offer 
redress for damage resulting from any violation of the Convention.
133
 
The issue of access to an effective remedy is essential in the ensuring that 
rights are tackled locally within national jurisdictions. This access would is 
essential for the full realisation of the principle of subsidiarity within the 
Convention system. National access to remedies affords a more immediate 
avenue for redress for victims whose rights have been infringed. The Court 
in its adjudication of the provision is not always consistent as it goes as far 
as requiring certain measures to be taken but then falls short of specifying 
 
125 C. Ovey and R. White; Jacobs and White on the European Convention of Human Rights 
pp. 471 
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effective investigation capable of identifying and punishing those responsible for the acts of 
ill treatment’. 
128 Ibid.126 
129 Schutte v Austria [2007] App. No. 18015/03 Para 36 
130 Kudla v Poland [2000] Ap. No. 302 10/96 Para 158 
131 Steven Greer – The European Convention on Human Rights ; Achievements, Problems 
and Prospects [2006] Cambridge University Press pp. 281 
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133 Group of Wise Persons set up by the Action Plan under the Third Summit of Heads of 
States, Council Of Europe [2005], Para 24 - referred to a mechanism that would remedy 
systemic or structural shortcomings in law or practice by State.
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what those measures ought to amount to. Some scholars as mention 
previously may view this as failing on part of the purpose of the Court. 
However an explanation of this reluctance may surround some of the issues 
previously pointed to in the earlier chapters of the thesis, whereby the Court 
is wary of its success and does not wish to assert itself or its authority 
through reaching farther than the Convention and its drafters intend. This 
may risk alienation between the High Contracting parties and the Court. 
Note that, as stated before, the purpose of the Convention cannot be met by 
either the Court itself or the High Contracting parties alone; rather it requires 
cooperation between the two actors.  
 
An illustration of this point is visible through Court case law whereby 
it has found that; new legislation enacted by the government to remedy 
widespread and systemic delays in judicial proceedings, itself violated the 
Convention.
134
 It is such manifestation of the right to an effective remedy is 
what has prompted the Court to expand its modern interpretation of the 
provision and specify the type of remedy that national governments must 
provide to individuals whose rights they have violated.
135
 National authorities 
are in a position to implement domestic measures that ensure more 
immediate access of remedies for its nationals. The Court however is needed 
to determine the compliance of such measures with the rights as contained 
within the Convention. 
 
 
134 Scordino v Italy No.0 1 GC [2006] In this case; issue of remedy for the infringement had 
been settled by legislation and not judicially) This is turn resulted in less compensation for 
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the repealed legislation) 
135 Assembly debate on 28 September 2000 (30th Sitting) (see Doc. 8808, report of the 
Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, rapporteur: Mr Jurgens). Systemic human 
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September 2000 (30th Sitting) accessed via 
http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/AdoptedText/ta00/ERES 1226.htm 
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4 The Extended Application of the Principle of 
Subsidiarity within the Reforms 
This chapter sets out to outline the path towards reform by looking at some 
of the background material that eventually led to the Brighton reforms 
examined within the thesis research. As the former chapters have outlined, 
the workload of the Court as well the relationship between Contracting 
Parties and the Court dictated a need for review. There prompted a need for 
improvement in the interaction of the Parties responsible for ensuring the 
effective application of the Convention. The extended application of the 
principle of subsidiarity is inherent within the new reforms as the instrument 
to improve the operation of bodies within Council of Europe in their aim of 
rights protection.  The chapter will examine the reforms as well as the 
concept of the principle of subsidiarity to determine whether this is possible. 
The first formal step toward reform occurred during the Third Summit 
of Heads of State
136
, whereby a Working Group
137
 was set up to specifically 
address some of the difficulties brought to light and propose workable 
solutions. The new proposals presented in a report
138
 to the Committee of 
Ministers aimed at enhancing the effective functioning of the judicial control 
mechanism, the ECtHR. The first proposal encouraged greater flexibility of 
the procedure for reforming the judicial machinery.
139
 There was a call to 
establish a judicial filtering system
140
 to help deal with the increasing amount 
of applications to the Court through the right to individual petition and 
establishment of the pilot judgment scheme
141
. Proposals called for 
advisory opinions
142
 to act as a form of increased cooperation between 
the Court and national courts. Additionally the proposals called for 
enhancement of the Court’s case law in State Parties143.  
136 The Third Summit of Heads of States and Government of the Member States of the 
Council of Europe (Warsaw) 16 -17 May 2005 accessed via 
https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=860063&Site=COE  
137 Group of Wise Persons set up by the Action Plan under the Third Summit of Heads of 
States, Council Of Europe [2005] accessed via 
http://www.coe.int/t/dcr/summit/200505 1 7jlan action en.asp  
138 Report to the Committee of Ministers of the Group of Wise Persons , CM [2006] 203 15 
November 2006 accessed via https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=1063779&Site=CM  
139 Ibid.138, Para 1 
140 Ibid.139, Para 2 
141 Ibid.140, Para 7 
142 Ibid.141, Para 4 
143 Ibid.142, Para 3
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The proposal that prompts relevance here is the extension of the duties of 
the Commissioner for Human Rights. The Working Group proposed that the 
Commissioner leads the assistance machinery at national level, by building a 
network of national and regional ombudsmen and national human rights 
institutions [hereafter NHRIs]. This network in turn could then work 
together to reduce the Court’s workload with the active support of the 
Commissioner.
144
A draft Protocol
145
 emerged which aimed to incorporate 
some of the changes mentioned within the report. Although drafting process 
occurred a year before the presentation of this report to the Committee of 
Ministers, ratification of this Protocol did not occur until after the Interlaken 
Conference. I will therefore go through some of the issues raised there 
before returning to discuss the impact of Protocol no.14 as mentioned. 
4.1 Implicit inference towards the enhancement of 
subsidiarity through the Interlaken and Izmir processes 
The Interlaken
146
 Conference is the first conference aimed at completing an 
action plan targeting the reform towards the Convention and its supervisory 
machinery. During this, there is reiteration of the right to individual petition 
as the cornerstone of the Convention system. However, there is expressed 
concern that the increase in its use is reflection for the need for reform 
pursuing greater and more effective implementation of the Convention at 
national level. The action plan within the Interlaken Declaration [hereafter 
the Declaration] drawn during the Conference discussed introduction of new 
legal remedies of general or specific nature to offer redress and effective 
remedy to persons who faced violations of their rights and freedoms
147
. 
There was discussion of ensuring greater awareness of the Convention and 
its system in an effort to ensure that its application procedure and 
admissibility is properly utilised by applicants. There was consideration of 
implementing a filtering procedure of whereby a single judge could review 
applications and admissibility cases
148
. 
The Declaration expressed concern of the increasing repetitive 
applications and encouraged the facilitation of friendly settlements and 
adoption of unilateral decisions through the pilot judgment scheme. The 
discussion carried on to the need for clear and predictable standards of the 
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pilot scheme discussed together with the issue of whether the single judge 
responsible for the filtering system could also handle repetitive cases. There 
was a request for State Parties to cooperate with the Council of Europe and 
solve any structural problems revealed by any judgment.
149
 The action plan 
reiterated the need for shared responsibility of the Convention between the 
Court and High Contracting Parties. It encouraged the Court to avoid acting 
as a fourth instance court in matters considering questions of fact or national 
law that have already been discussed by national authorities. It expressed the 
need for the Court to apply uniform and rigorous criteria concerning the 
admissibility and jurisdiction by taking into account its subsidiarity role 
when interpreting and applying the Convention.
150
 
The Interlaken Conference initially aimed to propose solutions 
for the pending problems faced by the Council of Europe and its bodies 
which include the European Court of Human Rights as well as the 
Committee of Ministers which comprises of all the Heads of States for all 
High Contracting Parties within the Council  of Europe. By it 
commencement however, the tone of the discussion seemed to have shifted 
slightly to focus on ensuring that the Court understood its role as one that is 
subsidiary as established by the Convention. Emphasis was placed on the 
recognition of the role that national authorities play in guaranteeing and 
protecting human rights at national level as essential and key in the effective 
implementation of the instrument.
151 
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Three months after the Interlaken Declaration, Protocol no. 14
152 
came into 
force and held some but not all of the proposed changes as discussed 
previously. The Protocol established the filtering system, allowing a single judge 
to deal with clearly inadmissible applications. It created a new admissibility 
criterion that allowed judges to declare inadmissible cases whereby applicant 
has not suffered a significant disadvantage. It also put in place measures to 
deal with repetitive cases.
153
 The content of the Protocol no,14 does indicate 
that at this stage of the reforms, subsidiarity was important within the 
discussions but not the main focus of what constituted as essential reforms 
regarding the Convention and its supervisory mechanism. 
If then one moves on to review the second stage towards reform 
s through the Izmir
154
 Conference. It also indicates a focus on seeking to 
evaluate the progress made by both the Interlaken Declaration and Protocol 
No.14 of the Convention. The Izmir Declaration recognised the 
extraordinary contribution of the ECtHR towards the protection of 
human rights.
155
 It makes reference to the principle by stating that the 
subsidiarity character of the Convention constitutes a fundamental and 
transversal principle that both the Court and State Parties must take into 
account.
156
 It then goes to make clear it objective which is review the 
effectiveness of both the Interlaken Declaration as well as the Protocol 
no.14. The text of the Izmir Declaration implies greater focus of the debate 
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to surround issues of whether greater reform towards the Convention system 
is needed. Whilst reference of the principle of subsidiarity is inherent, the 
focus seems to lie with noting concern of the extent of problems pending 
such as the continuing increase in the number of applications brought before 
the Court. It expresses particular concern to the increase in the number of 
interim measures requested in accordance with Rule 39 of the Rules of the 
Court, since the Interlaken Conference,
157
 as this affects the workload of the 
Court
158
. The Izmir Declaration can be defined to be a stamp of record 
taking note of the inefficiencies and flaws within the Convention system. 
Arguably it serves the purpose of highlighting the inevitability and need for 
reform to occur on a more concrete basis. The Declaration does so by 
acknowledging that provisions introduced by Protocol No.14 solely will not 
allow for a balance between the incoming cases and output of ensuring 
effective treatment of the growing applications and underlying urgency of 
adopting measures.
159
 
The Izmir Declaration main role was to affirm the need for 
bodies within the Council of Europe to act and make feasible reforms that 
can allow the Convention and its supervisory mechanism to function in a 
manner that is effective and clear. The observations in this chapter point 
towards a system with flaws despite inhabitating a certain level of the 
principle of subsidiarity. The Izmir Declaration is key towards the 
discussion of the principle of subsidiarity because it points out the 
deficiencies within a system the holds some degree of balance due to 
existence of some implicit mode of subsidiarity with the Convention. It 
makes it clear that the implicit form of subsidiarity existing within the 
Convention system is one that requires improvement. 
A factor established by the Izmir Declaration is in reference to 
the admissibility criteria as an essential tool in managing the Court’s 
caseload and giving practical effect to the principle of subsidiarity.
160
The 
use of the language relating directly to the principle infers a need for greater 
clarity.  
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Analysis of the Declaration points to the claim that perhaps due the lack of 
explicit reference of the principle with the Convention; the Court as well as 
High Contracting Parties fail to benefit. It would seem here that a lack of 
implicit reference to subsidiarity within the Convention is acceptable by at 
least national authorities to be inherent in increasing some of the problems 
faced by the Convention’s supervisory mechanism.  
 
This can be inferred from its follow up report, whereby the 
Declaration makes it clear that the Court is not a fourth instance court and that 
treatment of requests for interim measures must take place in full conformity 
with the principle of subsidiarity.
161
 There is encouragement for the Court 
to apply fully all admissibility criteria and rules regarding the scope of its 
jurisdiction. This obligation placed on the Court by High Contracting 
Parties to give full effect to the admissibility criteria in accordance with the 
principle deminimis non curat praetor
162
 strengthens the author’s claim that 
implicit reference to the principle of subsidiarity is a factor.  
 
The need for States to remind the supervisory mechanism not 
concern itself with trivial matters and thus confirm through its case law that is 
not a fourth instance court; by avoiding the re-examination of issues of facts 
and law decided by national courts
163
 presumes that an explicit reference of the 
principle within the Convention would be enough to ensure that Courts need 
not be reminded of their role in comparison to that of the national authorities. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
157 Ibid. 150, Para 7 
158 Ibid. 151, Para 12 
159 Ibid. 152, Para 3 under the Sub-heading The Conference 
160 Ibid. 153, Para 4 under the Sub-heading The Conference 
161 Ibid. 154, Para 3 under the Sub-heading The Follow Up Plan 
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An analysis of the Izmir Declaration does indicate the approach towards 
subsidiarity as political from the perspective of the Committee of Ministers. 
In the next chapter greater exploration of subsidiarity will occur. This in 
turn will go back to examining whether the explicit reference of the principle of 
subsidiarity is capable of producing the desired results as proclaimed during 
the Izmir Conference. Perhaps the actual understanding and approach of the 
concept of subsidiarity also plays a role in determining the outcome results. 
Before doing so, however, the next chapter will look to examine the new 
reforms as introduced through the Brighton Conference and determine the 
extent in which subsidiarity as a principle is included and extended.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
162
The
 
admissibility criteria contained within Protocol No. 14; the provision narrows the 
scope of the Convention to exclude minor damage the victim can readily make good. 
163 Ibid. 162, Para 2 (a) (b) (c) under the Sub-heading The Court
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5 Explicit Introduction of the Principle of 
Subsidiarity through the Brighton Conference 
This chapter discusses the next stage of reform that continues from where 
the Izmir Declaration ends and constitutes the third and final stage of current 
reforms headed for the Convention and its supervisory machinery. 
 
The Brighton Declaration 1 6 4  reiterated the shared 
responsibility of both High Contracting Parties and the Court in the 
realisation and effective implementation of the Convention, underpinned by 
the principle of subsidiarity. It also recognised that the Convention reflects 
the principle of equality amongst States.165 The Declaration encourages 
State Parties to work in partnership with the Court, drawing on the 
important work of the Committee of Ministers and the Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe as well as the Commissioner for Human 
Rights and other institutional bodies of the COE and in cooperation with 
civil society and NHRIs.166 It acknowledges the positive results achieved so 
far by Protocol No.14, however reflects on the need for further measures to 
ensure the Convention system remains effective in protecting rights of over 
800 million people within Europe.167 
 
 
 
 
 
 
164 High Level Conference on the Future of the European Court of Human Rights – 
organised within the framework of the United Kingdom Chairmanship of the Committee of 
Ministers of the Council of Europe, Brighton, UK 18 -20 April 2012 accessed via 
http://hub.coe.int/2012041 9-brighton-declaration  
165 Draft Group on the Draft Declaration for the High Level Conference on the Future of the 
ECtHR – Secretariat of the Committee of Ministers , 12 April 2012 
166 Ibid. 159, Para 4 
167 Ibid. 160, Para 6
 
168
Ibid. 161, Para 15 (c) changes to admissibility criteria under article 35 (3) (c) increase the 
threshold of the level required to be defined as significantly disadvantaged thereby 
amounting to a victim 
169 Laurence R Helfer – The Burdens and Benefits of Brighton , European Society of 
International Law June 08 2012 Volume 01 Issue 1
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The new reforms introduce some hard law168 provisions that give greater 
deference to national authorities. The changes within the admissibility criteria 
are contained in the new draft Protocol No.15. The Protocol once adopted will 
be binding upon ratification by all Members of the Council of Europe. They 
also subtly suggest that the Court refrains from scrutinising national 
governments for the sake of maintaining consistency in the application of the 
margin of appreciation doctrine. This part of the proposals are non- binding 
but do complement the changes in hard law aimed at decreasing the 
applications and thereby issues upon which the Court may adjudicate.169 
Within the Brighton debate there was discussion of increasing the of 
transparency within the Convention system by the including guiding principles 
of the Convention i.e. the principle of subsidiarity and the doctrine of the 
margin of appreciation as developed by the Court’s case law in the pre-amble 
of the Convention.  
It is important to note this particular objective as previously in the 
former chapters, it seems clear that the Court as supervisory machinery 
dictates the guiding principles of the Convention.
170
 Arguably within the 
previous section of the thesis, there has been mention of the Court eagerness 
to determine and apply what the Court perceive to be guiding principles of 
the Convention as derived from the text of the Convention. The success in 
developing some of these guiding principles has made for basis of certain 
critiques towards the Court. It is therefore worth comparing the exercise of 
this role of determining what guiding principles to include in the Convention 
as key in appeasing critiques who view the Court as revolutionary when they 
take it upon themselves to include principles that are not necessarily visible 
within the Convention or its text. 
 
Following in the line of the Izmir and Interlaken Declarations, the 
Brighton Declaration considered the systemic issues as identified by the Court 
and called for various ideas to be out forward taking into account the legal, 
practical and financial implications. It also within the same paragraph referred 
to the principle of equality of States.  
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An example of an existing measure in response to the above statement is the 
Human Rights Trust Fund
171
; which offers financial support to Members of 
the Council of Europe who undertake activities aimed at ensuring the 
effective implementation of the Convention within domestic orders. 
Additional proposals within the Declaration include the building on the Pilot 
scheme through the review of the advisability and modalities of such a 
procedure. The pilot procedure is whereby a group of applicants that allege 
the same violation against the respondent State receive such a determination 
that is applicable to the whole group.
172
 The Declaration urged the Court to 
consult State Parties when considering the application of a broader 
interpretation of the concept of ‘well established case law’ within the 
meaning of article 28 (1), so as to adjudicate more cases under a Committee 
procedure. There was also contemplation of consulting with civil society on 
whether to introduce online procedure for applications to the Court.
173
 
 
In conclusion, the Brighton Declaration deems it necessary to 
evaluate the fundamental role and nature of the Court. It indicated the desire 
for that the Court to move towards a position whereby it focuses its efforts 
on serious, widespread violations systemic and structural problems and 
important questions of interpreting and applying the Convention. The 
impact of this is that it will then remedy fewer violations and deliver fewer 
judgements.
174
 The Declaration also stipulates the underlying factor which 
is that such focus of the Court is feasible only if greater protection of rights 
occurs at national level. This focus on shifting the role of the Court towards 
an administrative and partly constitutional in nature purpose, is what prompts 
the author to label the notion of subsidiarity introduced within the reforms as 
political in nature. By political, the author refers to the insistence by national 
authorities for the Court to allow greater deference to them in matters of 
human rights protection and implementation. 
 
170 Ibid. 162, Para 12 (b) 
171 The Human Rights Trust Fund was set up in March [2008] by the Norway as founding 
contributor. UK, Germany, Finland and the Netherlands are other Members of the Council of 
Europe that have joined – it aspires to have all COE Members join voluntarily. 
172 Ibid. 164, Para 20 (d) 
173 Ibid. 165, Para 20 (f) & (g) 
174 Ibid. 166, Para 30 – 33 
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This urgency to gain greater national deference indicates the support of 
approaching subsidiarity within the Convention as a concept in favour of 
pluralism. By pluralism, the author is referring to the idea that, the reforms 
introduced indicate the need for national authorities to place their own 
approach and perspective when defining as well as implementing rights as 
contained within the Convention. If one then recalls the existence of multiple 
countries within the Council of Europe who all have varying legal, political 
and cultural settings, it seems inevitable that pluralism in standards of human 
rights protection in the context of the European system will emerge.  
 
Some criticism emerges towards this understanding and 
application of the principle of subsidiarity; which emphasises its 
favouritism of pluralism. Some scholars contend the need for some 
uniformity in the interpretation and application of human rights norms as a 
condition for the realisation of the rule of law. The Court in performing its 
role attempts exactly this as stated in earlier sections of the paper. The 
encouragement of pluralism undermines the stability and predictability 
necessary for a well-ordered system that sets justice by ensuring the like cases 
are treated alike and that legal norms progress with reasonable certainty. 175 
The outcome of the Brighton Declaration therefore is worth some scrutiny 
to determine the extent that subsidiarity as a principle is intend to operate 
as guiding principle within the Convention. 
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a) Post Brighton Declaration 
This section will discuss the outcome of the three conferences put together 
and review some of the legal material that has derived from the Brighton 
Declaration. The Declaration is soft law this means it is operational as 
guiding material but needs strengthening in legal meaning through drafts of 
legally into binding documents. This section will review whether such steps 
in response to the Brighton Declarations and analyse the content of any such 
measures to analyse impact. 
 
The Outcome of the Brighton Declaration materialised in two Draft 
Protocols. The Working Group176 mandated with addressing the deadlines 
for achieving results is already underway in its work. It started by creating and 
supervising two drafting groups; the first Draft Group177 engaged in the 
analysis of the national implementation of the Interlaken and Izmir 
Declarations and the evaluations of Protocol No.14 and on the impact of these 
on the Courts situation. 
 
The findings of the Draft Group were somewhat worrisome as 
several problems are still evident.178 There is failure for States to execute 
ECtHR judgments partially due to lack of political will as evidenced by Italy 
in its response to the Hirsi and Others judgment by continuing to deport 
individuals to Libya, and Russia’s failure to carry out investigations in 
response to related judgments in Isayeva v Russia.179 
 
 
175 Laurence R Helfer - Redesigning the European Court of Human Rights; Embeddedness 
as a deep structural principle of the European Regime European Journal of International 
Law [2008] Vol. 19 No.01, pp.78 
176 Steering Committee for Human Rights – Follow Up to the High Level Conference (18- 
19 April) Document prepared by Secretariat on its 75
th 
Meeting Tuesday 19 – 20 June 2012 
Council of Europe , CDDH ,009, Agora Building Room G 03 accessed via 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/cddh/CDDH-
DOCUMENTS/CDDH(2012)014%20E%20Reference%20document%2076th%20meeting  
%20November%202012.pdf 
177 (1) (GT – GDR – A) Drafting Group A 
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Nearly all States within the report have difficulty executing pilot judgments 
and addressing other systemic Convention violations and States are 
demonstrating serious limitations in their ability to devise effective 
implementation measures and coordinating complex layers of responsible 
parties.180 An example is Italy’s lengthy proceedings in courts, whereby 1155 
cases a violation of article 6.1 occurred.181 Other barriers impede the ability 
of complainants to access effective national remedies such as statutory 
prohibitions against reopening domestic proceedings.182 There is a failure on 
Parliaments and judiciary in the countries to incorporate ECHR case law into 
their work, at worst state organs directly contravene ECHR decisions. 
There is further failure to establish specific domestic structures aimed at 
implementing the Convention such as NHRIs. States make use of existing 
structures who in many cases are ill equipped to handle the continuous flow 
of ECHR related tasks. The impact this has is that when addressing 
issues, the structures have vague mandates, overlapping 
responsibilities183 and are limited in their ability to offer effective remedy 
and redress. This serious failure to correct systematic human rights violations, 
or to integrate the Convention and ECtHR case law into regular judicial and 
parliamentary practices not only amount to bureaucratic debacles, they result 
in serious human rights problems and add to the increase in individual 
applications to the Court.184 The role of the Draft Group A is to highlight 
some of the shortcomings of the existence mechanisms of protection for 
rights and paint a valid picture of the extent of concerns as expressed to 
enable proper procedures to be crafted awarding effective solutions. This is 
something that they have carried well. 
 
178 National Implementation of the Interlaken Declaration, -Perspectives of European Civil 
Society on national implementation of ID and Action Plan: Czech, Hungary, Italy, Russia 
and Poland - Document submitted by Open Society Justice Initiative to the CCDH, 
Committee of Experts on the reform of the Court (DH – GDR) 2012 009 Para 9 
179 see Abuyeva v Russia Judgement [2010] Para 238 -241 
180
Ibid. 178, Para 19 
181 Ibid. 180, Para 20, see; ECHR Violation by Article and State; 1959 -2011 
182 Ibid. 181 , Para 29 note : Czech Republican; the Constitutional Court lacks the power to 
review prosecutorial authorities’ substantive reasons and justification for bringing charges 
against an individual 
183 Ibid. 182, Para 40 – 50 
184 Ibid. 183, Para 61
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b) Explicit reference to the Principle of Subisidiarity within 
Draft Protocols No.15 
The Working Group also supervises Draft Group B185tasked with drafting 
legal instruments to implement Committee of Ministers decisions taken 
further to the Brighton Conference. Their first task was to draw up Draft 
Protocol. The Draft Protocol No.15186 refers to subsidiarity and the margin 
of appreciation to be contained within the Pre-amble of the Convention. 
Article 1 of the Protocol makes explicit states that the primary 
responsibility to secure rights lies with national authorities subject to the 
supervisory jurisdiction by the Court in accordance with the principle of 
subsidiarity in conjunction with the margin of appreciation doctrine. This 
explicit reference affirms that subsidiarity and, to a certain extent, the 
related doctrine of a “margin of appreciation,” as developed by the Court 
require that the Strasbourg Court plays a complementary role to domestic 
court decisions and legislation: states have the duty to integrate Convention 
standards, as interpreted by the Court, within their own legal systems. In 
other words, the principle of subsidiarity has two aspects: one procedural, 
requiring individual to go through all the relevant procedures at national 
level before seizing the Court, and the other substantive, based on the 
assumption that states are, in principle, better placed to assess the necessity 
and proportionality of specific measures that may interfere with certain 
rights.187 
185 Drafting Group B (GT – GDR-B) 
186 Draft Protocol No.15 to the European Convention of Human Rights, Report of 
Rappoteur; Mr Christopher Chope – draft opinion adopted unanimously by the Committee 
in Paris March 2013 Doc.13093 D.P amending the ECHR, January 19
th 
2013 Committee 
on Legal  Affa ir s  and Human Rights accessed via 
http://www.assembly.coe.int/Communication/ajdoc1 1 201 3.pdf 
187 Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, Report On the Draft Protocol No. 15 to 
the European Convention on Human Rights Rapporteur: Mr Christopher Chope, United 
Kingdom, European Democratic Group pp.3-4 accessed via 
http://www.assembly.coe.int/Communication/ajdoc1 1 _201 3.pdf 
188 Ibid. 187, Para 2 (iii) 
189 Ibid. 188, Para 15 (a) & (c)
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The Protocol further indicates greater need for subsidiarity in its other 
reforms. It incorporates the amendment of article 35 (3) (b) of the Convention 
which relates to the significant disadvantage admissibility criteria.188 It does so 
by prompting the deletion of the present admissibility requirement, in Article 
35, paragraph 3, (b), of the Convention, which specifies that no case be 
rejected under the criterion of absence of ‘significant disadvantage’ if it 
has not been duly considered by a domestic court. Further amendments to 
the admissibility criteria, include the shortening, from six to four months, of 
the time-limit within which an application can be brought before the Court after 
all domestic remedies have been exhausted, as stipulated in Article 35, 
paragraph 1, of the Convention.189 There was discussion of a need to 
adopt a priority policy where focus of the Court is on the most important and 
serious cases and adoption of working methods that streamline procedures for 
the handling of inadmissible and repetitive cases while maintaining appropriate 
judicial responsibility.
190
 
All the reforms incorporated within the draft Protocol are 
largely targeted at the reform of the supervisory mechanism itself or its 
application of the Convention. This in turn indicates an urgent the need to 
reform and critique the manner in which the Court has been applying the 
European Convention which some scholars argue is misleading to the public 
because it suggests that reform of the Court alone is needed.
191
 It is this 
approach of viewing the new reforms that manifests the introduction of the 
principle of subsidiarity within the Convention as a political maneuver. There 
is ongoing debate in the context of viewing subsidiarity as a political principle. 
As previously mentioned the concept is not one that is new within the 
European Convention system. However despite its practice by the Court, note 
should be made that subsidiarity is yet to be defined in exact terms. 
Consequently the concept is not able to provide procedures for evaluating 
how the principle should be applied in future policy deliberation. The 
principle offers no indication of which body is to be responsible for tackling 
what human rights issues. Rather it serves to explain the existing 
complexities surrounding international systems such as that of the European 
Convention system of rights protection. 
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5.2 Reconciling the principle of subsidiarity with the human 
rights protection within the ECHR 
This section reviews the principle of subsidiary within the ECHR 
framework and relates this specifically to perspectives adopted by bodies 
within the Council of Europe’s human rights system. The chapter seeks to 
evaluate what impact if any the explicit reference to the principle of 
subsidiarity will have on the application of the Convention. It will 
distinguish the definition of the principle held by the Court as well High 
Contracting Parties in relation human rights adjudication. The section also 
highlights the temporal status as mediator attached to the principle and 
analyses some of arguments supporting this. 
Within the ECHR framework, the principle of subsidiarity is one 
that developed through the interpretation of the Convention rules by the Court, 
it is not before been mentioned specifically in the legal instrument itself. The 
concept is implicit in the wording of article 1 of the Convention that states;; 
‘High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the 
rights and freedoms defined in Section 1 of the Convention. Subsequent case 
law
192
 within the Court defines the principle as one that describes the 
systemic relationship the Court and State Parties with reference to both 
article 1 and article 19 of the Convention.
193
 The principle of subsidiarity in 
the context of the European Human Rights system is definable as 
complimentary.
194
 It invokes the right for the Court to intervene but only in 
case whereby domestic authorities are incapable of ensuring effective 
protection of rights guaranteed within the Convention.
195
  
 
 
190 Ibid. 181, Para 20 (b) (i) & (ii) 
191 “The future of the Strasbourg Court and enforcement of ECHR standards: reflections on 
the Interlaken process”, Conclusions of the AS/Jur’s Chairperson, Mrs. Herta Däubler-
Gmelin, of the hearing held in Paris on 16 December 2009, document AS/Jur (2010)06 at: 
http://assembly.coe.int/CommitteeDocs/201 0/20100121 _ajdoc06%20201 0.pdf. 192 
Scordino v Italy (no.1) GC App. No. 36813/97 ECHR [2006] Ct makes reference to 
‘subsidiarity character as articulated in article 13 and 35 (1) of the Convention’
  61 
The principle is aided by the structure of International law that holds States 
as primary subjects and affirms the subjectivity of natural persons in 
International law as being dependent upon State consent.
196
 An illustration 
of this is in the Bankovich
197
 case whereby the subordination of rights of 
individuals came secondary to the structural rules within International law 
pertaining to jurisdiction. 
 
Due to the development of the concept, more parties are seeking 
to define and own the concept on their own terms and models. Evidently the 
principle is desired due to its flexibility in allowing for a balanced yet 
acceptable approach in matters of conflict resolutions. By this, the author is 
not stating that the principle provides for all or any answers when faced 
difficult questions. Rather it would seem that the principle is vital in pointing 
towards a procedure by which to resolve complex structural issues. It provides 
for an understanding as why complex scenarios might exist and goes on to 
offer varied paths towards resolving such issues. If one then reviews 
the relationship between the Court and national authorities in rights 
protection. If one adds the notion of State Sovereignty into the mix, limited 
power exists for the Court to intervene in the legal systems of Contracting 
Parties. Thus States must be the ones to first address human rights issues arising 
on their territory. Despite this, the extent of the principle of subsidiarity 
especially as indicated in the reforms one that is limited. 
When reviewing the reforms it appears that differing approaches 
towards the notion of subsidiarity exist between the High Contracting 
parties and the Court. National authorities arguably would define the 
concept in a political manner.  
 
193 Ibid. 185, Para 140 
194 Interlaken Follow-Up Note by Jurisconsult on the Principle of Subsidiarity Para 
195 Ibid. 186 Para 3 see also; Varnava and Others v Turkey GC no.16064/90 [2009] 
196 Ibid. 188 Para 8 
197 Bankovich and Others v Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, 
Spain, Turkey and the United Kingdom App. No. 52207/99 [2001] 
198 Hansard's, vol. 884, 16 Jan.1975, col. 859 & col. 862 and Hansard's, vol. 843, 17 Oct. 
1972, cols.141-142. 
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From an economic point of view, some scholars label this to be what then 
transforms into political subsidiarity. By this the term subsidiarity refers to 
decision making occurring as close to an individual as possible.  It is this belief 
that that decisions should be taken, where possible, at the lowest level 
compatible with efficiency
198
 that labels the definition political as regional 
authority points towards the State as the decision making. Supporters of 
political subsidiarity which would include High Contracting parties within the 
Council of Europe would claim that this definition awards more legitimacy to 
the decision and the decision maker as they are in a position to assess better 
the circumstances pertaining to the issue at hand and in the local context 
surrounding the issue itself.
199
 This contradiction and difference in defining 
and applying the concept of subsidiarity leads to undermining the value of 
the principle in the eyes of some scholars. Some would argue that this 
distinction in the concept that incurs this level of flexibility that labels the term 
as vague and arguably see any adoption of this principle as one that parties, 
in particular political parties, adopt in the hope to mould it and give it any 
meaning they desire.
200
 
 
Endo goes as further in providing a rationale for the desire for political 
parties in particular to defend the principle of subsidiarity by stating that 
this is done also as a defence of their institutional prerogatives. In other 
words national authorities seek to place decision making at domestic level 
and see the principle as a tool that can assist in achieving this.
201
 This way 
of approaching the concept some scholars refer to as a form of negative 
subsidiarity, whereby member states assert that authority lies primarily with 
them and seek to apply the principle for the purposes of limiting the 
competences of the international body in relation to that of the national entities. 
202 
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The ideological approach towards the concept from the perspective of the 
Court differs from that perceived by the high contracting parties. Both entities 
understand the concept to be one that allows for the distribution of authority. 
The language and content of the reforms however seems to suggest that this is 
a position that both parties are clear on. Further analysis into the implication of 
the reforms suggest an differing approach whereby the Court could resort to 
applying its own understanding of the role that the principle of subsidiarity 
plays in promoting and ensuring rights protection. Such an understanding is 
likely to be judicial in nature due to the role attached to the Court and its 
judges. If one reviews the manner in which the Court applies the 
Convention, more than one principle is used; an example would be the 
principle of effectiveness.
203
  
 
This principle requires the Convention to be applied in a manner that 
is effective in theory and practice. The effect then is that if the adhering to 
the principle of subsidiarity results in a denial of justice, rendering rights 
and guarantees under the Convention as inoperative; the Court can and must 
intervene through the role attributed to it within article 19 of the 
Convention.
204
 Following on from the principle of effectiveness is the 
principle of evaluative interpretation. This refers to the Convention as a 
‘living instrument’ that must be interpreted in the light of modern day 
conditions’.205 
 
 
 
199 Kees Van Kersbergen and Bertjan Verbeek, “The Politics of Subsidiarity in the 
European Union,” Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 32, No. 2 (June 1994): 215- 
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Journal of Common Market Studies Vol. 44, No. 2 (2006) 28 1-304) 
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This way of interpreting the Convention has resulted in the Courts intervention 
in specific matters previously left entirely to States’ discretion. With the new 
reforms placing the principle of subsidiarity at the forefront as a guiding 
principle of application of the Convention, the Court’s stance on how to apply 
this may change slightly to reflect the reforms but cannot does so at the 
expense of undermining other equally important principles of guidance 
within the Convention. 
 
The prediction of the author is that a judicial definition of the 
concept of subsidiarity is inevitable as the Court will have to elaborate more 
on what the principle entails following on from where the national 
authorities have aimed to lead the effect of this principle. By judicial 
subsidiarity, a scholar that best describes this would be Andreas Føllesdal, 
who points to the notion of judicial subsidiarity through dividing the 
purpose of the principle in three different categories: liberty, justice, 
and efficiency206. His first purpose of the concept which points towards 
liberty refers to the notion of minimal intervention by state in the life its 
citizens and ties in with the theory of subsidiarity which places the role of 
local and other human associations as existing only for the sole purpose of 
ensuring the flourishment of an individual.207  
The type of subsidiarity that he describes here is one that 
Folledals refers to as proscriptive in nature. This means that in relation to 
the ECHR framework, such a concept is one desired by political parties, 
whereby high contracting parties can choose to limit the scope of intervention 
by the Strasbourg Court in domestic matters.208 
 
The second purpose of subsidiarity which is justice offers more 
interaction between the state and its individuals. In other words, the state 
must act in a manner that benefits its citizens and this perhaps is the common 
reflection of subsidiarity whereby communication in form of political 
debate and participation occurs between the central and local entities, 
which it must be emphasised are made up of individuals and place the 
wishes of the individual at the fore front of any debate209.  
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The final manner in which Follesdal then reviews the purpose of 
subsidiarity as a concept to apply is that of ensuring efficiency. In other words, a 
cost benefit analysis is made to determine whether a decision pending is best 
decided at local level or at a higher level and the results producing the most 
efficient results determine which entity to carry out such decision 
making.210 Follesdal’s understanding of the subsidiarity concept is one that is 
in alignment with Endo’s definition of positive definition.  
 
This would support the idea that the international level of human 
association should exist to bring about uniform standards and only seek to 
intervene after assessing and reaching the conclusion that local and regional 
levels of human associations are unable to fulfill the task of maintaining the 
dignity of individuals.211 
 
The differing approaches towards the notion of subsidiarity indicate an 
inevitable struggle once more between the Court and High Contracting 
parties. The use of inevitability is supported by the fact that States seems to 
want to use the principle as one that asserts their sovereignty over the authority 
of the Court. However is one views the understanding of the Court of the 
principle, it is likely that for the Court to carry out its function, it must view 
and define the principle of subsidiarity as one that profaces intervention and 
assistance when local, regional and central authorities fail in their duty to 
protect rights. 
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6 Observations - The Impact of the Introduction 
for greater Application of Subsidiarity 
 
This chapter looks to summarise the main themes within the thesis in order 
to determine what impact the new reforms as introduced by the Brighton 
Conference will have on the future human rights adjudication within the 
European system. This chapter seeks to explore some of the effects, as well 
as predictions of what can be expected of the practical application of 
subsidiarity further within the Convention system. 
The reforms recognise the importance of the role of the Court 
and importance of maintaining the right for individual petitioning as the 
cornerstone of the Convention.
212
 If one however reads the language used in 
the drafting of the reform changes, it contains some structural imbalance. 
Member States receives all the benefits of the Declaration in form of 
‘dismissal of more applications and a more deferential review of those 
considered on the merits re human rights protections. The language of the 
text and its practical implications is one that is inspirational at best in the 
context of human rights protections. The commitment towards domestic 
implementation materialises in targetable terms.
213
 Illustration is that States 
are required to consider taking steps, consider measures so far as is relevant 
and encourage their adoption.
214
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There is a lack of corresponding obligation on the part of 
Member States in shouldering the burdens of fully implementing the 
Convention and ECtHR jurisprudence in national legal systems.
215
 It has 
been identified within the reforms themselves that; mechanisms need to 
exist that allow national governments to remedy violations at home. This in 
turn obviates the need for individuals to seek relief on international level 
and can restore countries to a position in which the Court’s deference to 
national decision –making holds merit. The lack of hard law to supplement 
this expression of concern makes it difficult to embrace the potential that the 
principle of subsidiarity within the reforms might have. It is difficult to 
imagine the success of the reforms, if imbalance exists in legal instructions, 
as this implies the effecting of practical measures as optional by national 
authorities as primary implementation actors of the Convention. 
 
The reforms also propose the continued application of the 
‘pilot judgment’ as a way to deal with the increasing workload of the 
Court. The ‘pilot judgment’ scheme refers to the already established 
practice by the Court to use the first application as a test case for similar 
applications with similar claims in response to the same respondent State. 
Some mention is made of assessing the impact of this procedure. 
Nevertheless, the new changes do not elaborate on the legitimacy and 
effectiveness of such a mechanism. No do they set any timeframe as to 
indicate the temporal status of this procedural until such time that it is 
functions at a legitimate level and corresponds with notions of transparency 
and accountability. The procedure allows a single judge to make judgments 
in cases similar of nature by using the platform of one such case, does 
appear problematic in some ways. Firstly, by using the first application, 
such an applicant gains privileged status as the Court takes into account the 
applicants’ individual circumstances. 
 
212 Ibid.164, Para 1-2 
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The pilot judgment procedure fails to take into account that one application 
does not reflect all the factual and legal issues raised by a violation. It does 
not allow for speedy justice as similar applications are in stasis
216
 or consider 
that variety in remedy might apply. The proposals for measures whereby the 
Court concentrates on identifying potential systemic violations through i.e. 
the pilot procedure as well the filtering system and the new power to provide 
advisory opinions indicates a desire by High Contracting parties for the Court to 
become more administrate in character. 
The principle of subsidiarity is clear in the way it defines 
relationships between local human associations and regional, national and 
international human associations. In the context of the Council of Europe’s 
human rights system, more efforts to enact hard law that offers an effective 
balance between the national authorities and the supervisory mechanism is 
still pending. The outcome of the reforms so far is less than satisfactory, 
nevertheless, as of yet, not all proposals within the Brighton Declaration 
have yet passed or reached the deadline on implementation. This leaves 
room for drafters mandated with the reforms to include more legal rules 
aimed at affirming the High Contracting Parties role in being effective in the 
role as first line defenders. This is a requirement for the principle of 
subsidiarity to be properly operated in practice, subsequently paving way for 
greater human rights protection. The manifestation of the principle within 
the reforms as being political is supported by this lack of balance in reforms. 
Targeted efforts should be placed on both the actors responsible for 
applying and implementing the Convention. The reforms so far indicate 
more efforts are needed for the principle of subsidiarity to have the greatest 
impact. On the other hand, the approach of the principle within political 
realms through the Committee of Ministers might indicate that the intention 
for the subsidiarity is indeed to award more deference to national authorities 
in matters pertaining to human rights and minimise the influence of the 
Court in domestic concerns. 
 
216 Ibid. 173, pp. 154 - See Registrar of the European Court of Human Rights, approx. 800 
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6.1 The Future for Human Rights Protection 
within the European system - Summary / 
Recommendations 
This section seeks to highlight the manner in which the new reforms can be 
reconciled with the functions performed by the supervisory mechanism of 
the Convention. There are recommendations of how to compliment both 
actors responsible for effecting human rights protection. Additionally there 
is exploration of the need to maintain an international European Court of 
Human Rights and the necessity for judicial review in order to ensure 
procedural justice. The section looks to determine that a separation into 
what constitutes human rights concerns or Convention based issues is not 
easily discerned. The demand therefore by national authorities within the 
reforms to refrain from influencing on domestic concerns is one that is 
difficult for the Court to abide by. 
 
The Court when applying the Convention do so in way that 
reflects modern day conditions. If the case law resulting form the Court’s 
adjudication is any indication, such circumstances mean that human rights 
and what falls within their realms is constantly evolving. Add the request by 
national authorities for the Court to distinguish between international and 
national concerns when adjudicating a human rights issue, the whole debate 
becomes increasingly more complex and harder to determine. This section 
seeks to bring the issues involved in this discussion to a more simplified 
level, that which is concerned with affording individuals with justice in 
situations whereby their rights have been infringed. It looks to assess how 
one can reconcile the notion of justice with the greater application of 
subsidiarity within the Convention system.  
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In this particular case, as the thesis is concerned with subsidiarity in the 
structural sense, focus is on the procedural aspect of what constitutes justice. 
Some reference to substantive justice is inevitable as the two forms of justice 
go hand in hand, however the author seeks to approach the debate mainly from 
the standpoint of what subsidiarity means for procedural justice. 
The underlying principle and definition of procedural justice does require that 
administrative action is scrutinised and held accountable to a certain 
standard. In the context of the ECHR, review of the decisions and actions 
taken by local and national governments regarding human rights protection 
must remain subject to scrutiny from others, who better than the supervisory 
mechanism placed in charge of this very function.  
 
In identifying the future of the supervisory mechanism, firstly 
acceptance of change is key. In fact, the principle of subsidiarity within the 
reforms pending plays a significant role in bolstering the Council of Europe 
mechanisms to ensure effective remedy by national governments at home. 
This in turn minimises the need for individuals to make use of the right for 
individual petitioning to seek relief at international level. It is evident that 
the new reforms seek to provide greater deference to national decision 
making regarding rights protection through subsidiarity. Validity of this 
principle is only achievable through measures that ensure effective and 
practical implementation of the Convention within domestic legal orders.  
 
The implementation of such measures within domestic systems 
would then give birth to the principle of embeddedness
217
. The principle of 
embedddedness is able to act as complimentary to sibsidiarity by 
strengthening its effects. States can choose to incorporate direct 
embeddedness whereby the Convention as a treaty is incorporated into 
domestic law. An illustration is the UK, who incorporated the Convention 
directly into their legal system through a Parliamentary Act.
218
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Alternatively, the Convention could be indirectly entrenched within 
domestic systems through its application. In other words, dispute resolution 
decisions can be implemented without the government having to take any 
action. An autonomous enforcement of the Convention would occur 
whereby national courts could enforce international judgments against their 
own governments. 
National authorities ought to utilise the principle of 
subsidiarity through the concept of embeddedness. An establishment of a 
body tasked specifically with the implementation of the Convention as well 
as execution of ECtHR judgments is essential. NHRIs can play a vital role 
as a separate body mandated with this specific task. The Human Rights 
Trust Fund can assist in monitoring and supervising implementation of 
amendments to systemic structures that breed gross violations. The HRTF is 
crucial in designating financial assistance towards national systems, in need 
of funds for effective legal, compliance with Convention standards. 
Furthermore, consultation with all members of society to review the 
outcome and impact of reforms should occur. The impact  that  
embeddedness as a complimentary principle to subsidiarity serves is that 
Convention rights become fully domesticated and compliance with 
international law and national law converges.
219
 
Evidently, the application of subsidiarity as a principle does 
not offer an exact formula; rather it seeks to restore balance amongst 
competing concerns of complex human rights problems. Subsidiarity is a 
general principle that must function alongside other principles within the 
international legal framework. The principle seeks to balance both the idea 
of non-interference and that of intervention or assistance. Whilst it does 
express a presumption in favour of the freedom of smaller and local forms 
of association, thereby encouraging the idea of pluralism within human 
rights protection. It also leaves room for the larger community to assist the 
local associations in achieving the common good whether such intervention 
takes place through interference or assistance is inconsequential. Balancing 
of interests is at the heart of the principle.
220
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When applied correctly, the principle does not appear to alter the existence 
nor the role that the European Court of Human Rights ought to play in 
rights protection. In fact it seems to encourage that international 
mechanisms remain to offer guidance, assistance and if necessary 
intervention when local remedies fail or are non-existent. The principle 
although clear in its preference for plurality at local level, thereby offering 
national authorities priority in rights protection, it does not undermine the 
importance played by an international tribunal in reviewing the input by 
domestic authorities in the role of implementing rights protection. 
In relation to the future of the Convention as well as its 
supervisory mechanism in protecting rights, if applied respectively and in a 
cooperative manner, the principle of subsidiarity will go a long way in 
effecting the implementation of the Convention. In turn, successful 
implementation will translate into greater embeddedness of the Convention 
within domestic legal orders. This is turn should pave the way for the 
greater protection of rights through practical implementation at home within 
reach and through local and national judicial systems. 
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